


























CARF is presently supported by Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.,  Citigroup,  Dai-ichi 
Mutual Life Insurance Company, Meiji Yasuda Life Insurance Company, Nippon Life Insurance 
Company, Nomura Holdings, Inc. and Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (in alphabetical 
















Working Papers are a series of manuscripts in their draft form.  They are not intended for 
circulation or distribution except as indicated by the author.  For that reason Working Papers may 
not be reproduced or distributed without the written consent of the author. 
   
CARF-F-241 
 
A Study of Financing Behavior of Japanese Firms with 
Firm-Level Data from Corporate Enterprise Quarterly 
Statistics - 1994~2009: Introduction and Summary 
 
Yoshiro Miwa 
The University of Tokyo   
 
January 2011  1
A Study of Financing Behavior of Japanese Firms with Firm-Level Data from 









From early spring to late summer in 2010 I investigated the financing behavior of 
Japanese firms with over ¥10 million in paid-in capital, using firm-level financial data from Hojin 
Kigyo Tokei Kiho (Corporate Enterprise Quarterly Statistics) of the Ministry of Finance. “A Study 
of Financing Behavior of Japanese Firms with Firm-Level Data from Corporate Enterprise 
Quarterly Statistics – 1994~2009”, divided into five discussion papers, constitutes the report. This 
Introduction and Summary forms the first of the five papers. The other four papers are: 
 
[I]. The Low “Bank-Dependence Ratio” and the Further Increase in the “Independence of Firms 
from Banks”. 
[II]. The Reality of Short-term Shocks like the “Credit Crunch” of 1997-1999 and the “Financial 
Crisis” of 2007, and the Effectiveness of “Emergency” Economic Measures – A Follow-up to 
Miwa [2008]. 
[III]. The Reality of Trade Credit and its Link to Bank Borrowing and Inventory: (1) Overall 
Discussion and Preliminary Investigation. 
[IV]. The Reality of Trade Credit and its Link to Bank Borrowing and Inventory: (2) Correlation 
Coefficients and Multiple Regressions.2 
 
 This  Statistics collects quarterly financial data from about 20,000 randomly sampled 
non-financial firms in 5 size-categories, most of which are unlisted small businesses. Using 
firm-level data in 1994-2009, I investigate the financing behavior of the firms in Japan during 
“the Lost Two Decades.” I explore the reality of the “Credit Crunch” of 1997-1999 and the 
“Financial Crisis” of 2007, the effectiveness of the policy measures adopted, and the effect of the 
“zero-interest-rate, quantity easing” monetary policy.   
  The most surprising finding is that the ratio of zero-short-term-borrowing was the 
highest, 50% in 1998 and two-thirds in 2008, among the smallest firms.    The average (short-term 
bank borrowing)/(total asset) ratio was also lowest among this group. This “Independence from 
Banks” is a fundamental challenge to the basic premise of the conventional wisdom about the 
Japanese financial market and corporate finance. 
                                                  
1  Professor, Department of Economics, University of Tokyo. This is an English version of the 
Discussion Paper in Japanese with the same title (CIRJE-J-222, Miwa [2010c]). It is part of my “A 
Study of Financing Behavior of Japanese Firms with Firm-Level Data from Corporate Enterprise 
Quarterly Statistics – 1994-2009”. This work was supported by MEXT KAKENHI, Grant-in-Aid 
for Scientific Research (C) 20530192. Email: miwa@e.u-tokyo.ac.jp 
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  From early spring to late summer in 2010 I investigated the financing 
behavior of Japanese firms with over ¥10 million in paid-in capital, using firm-level 
financial data from Hojin Kigyo Tokei Kiho (Corporate Enterprise Quarterly Statistics; 
hereafter, CEQStat) of the Ministry of Finance. “A Study of Financing Behavior of 
Japanese Firms with Firm-Level Data from Corporate Enterprise Quarterly Statistics – 
1994~2009”, divided into five discussion papers, constitutes the report.   
A wide variety of issues are discussed in this report, and this is one of the few 
occasions to make full use of this firm-level financial data. For this reason, this report is 
huge in size, approximately 400 pages, including a great number of figures and tables, 
approximately 800 in total.3  
This Introduction and Summary forms the first of the five papers (hereafter, 
DP0). The other four papers are: 
 
[I]. The Low “Bank-Dependence Ratio” and the Further Increase in the “Independence 
of Firms from Banks”, CIRJE-J-223 (hereafter, DP1). 
[II]. The Reality of Short-term Shocks like the “Credit Crunch” of 1997-1999 and the 
“Financial Crisis” of 2007, and the Effectiveness of “Emergency” Economic 
Measures – A Follow-up to Miwa [2008], CIRJE-J-224 (DP2). 
[III]. The Reality of Trade Credit and its Link to Bank Borrowing and Inventory: (1) 
Overall Discussion and Preliminary Investigation, CIRJE-J-225 (DP3). 
[IV]. The Reality of Trade Credit and its Link to Bank Borrowing and Inventory: (2) 
Correlation Coefficients and Multiple Regressions, CIRJE-J-226 (DP4). 
 
This  Statistics, CEQStat, collects quarterly financial data from about 20,000 
randomly sampled non-financial firms in 5 size-categories, most of which are unlisted 
small businesses. Using firm-level data in 1994-2009, I investigate the financing 
behavior of the firms in Japan during “the Lost Two Decades.” I explore the reality of 
the “Credit Crunch” of 1997-1999 and the “Financial Crisis” of 2007, the effectiveness of 
                                                  
3  In using firm-level data in government statistics in Japan, it is a rule to finish 
research within a predetermined period, return the dataset to the government, and 
publish the results as the reports like those discussion papers. Then anybody, including 
the researcher, would write academic papers, quoting figures and tables in the reports. 
As it is not easy to promptly conduct additional research with the same dataset, it is 
rational to prepare for the future potential needs, including a wide variety of many 
figures and tables exhaustibly in the reports.      4
the policy measures adopted, and the effect of the “zero-interest-rate, quantity easing” 
monetary policy.   
  The most surprising finding is that the ratio of zero-short-term-borrowing was 
the highest, 50% in 1998 and two-thirds in 2008, among the smallest firms. The average 
(short-term bank borrowing)/(total asset) ratio was also lowest among this group. This 
“Independence from Banks” is a fundamental challenge to the basic premise of the 
conventional wisdom about the Japanese financial market and corporate finance. 
  As the Introduction and Summary to the study, this paper is both for an 
introduction to and an overview of the study, briefly summarizing its parts. For this 
purpose I quote not a few figures and tables which symbolize the discussion. Fore more 
details of used variables and figures and tables, together with their explanation and 
discussion, I have to ask readers to refer to the related parts in DP1 ~ DP4. 
  For this reason, I place Roman numerical I ~ IV before the section numbers in 
DP1 ~DP4, respectively, and S&I to this paper. For instance, the section 2 of this paper 
is numbered [I&S-2], and the 3rd section of DP3 [III-3]. 
  Preceding to this study, I had an opportunity to use this statistics, the result of 
which is published as “‘Credit Crunch’?: Details from Borrower Quarterly Financial 
Data about What Actually Happened in Japan during 1997-1999” (CIRJE-J-202, August 
2008; Miwa, 2008). This study newly planned upon the experience and results of this 
preceding  study.      
 
Relationship with Miwa [2008] 
In Miwa[2008], I investigated individual firm’s financing behavior, including 
borrowings from financial institutions, during the “financial crisis” or “credit crunch”, 
from the end of 1997 to the beginning of 1999 in particular. For this purpose, I studied 
firm-level financial data of approximately 6,000 non-financial firms with more than 
¥600 million in paid-in capital from CEQStat (Ministry of Finance) financial data, from 
FY1994 to FY2000.4  
The dominant view and the conventional wisdom (hereafter, the conventional 
wisdom) argues that there was a serious “credit crunch” in Japan during this period, 
particularly between the end of 1997 and the beginning of 1999. I examined the 
short-term variations (quarter, semi-annual, and annual) in not only of borrowings from 
financial institutions (hereafter, bank borrowing: short-term borrowing, long-term 
                                                  
4  In Japan “fiscal year (FY)” begins in April. This statistics surveys information about 
all the non-financial firms with over ¥600 million in paid-in capital. In smaller size 
categories it surveys randomly sampled firms.  5
borrowing, and total borrowing5) but also of payables, receivables, deposits, and 
inventory, and also correlations between those financial variables. I found, however, no 
clear sign of serious “credit crunch”. It is unclear on what ground the conventional 
wisdom is based, and little empirical supporting evidence is presented.6 From this 
observation I concluded not to accept the argument that during the period from the end 
of 1997 to the beginning of 1999 there was a serious “credit crunch” in Japan. With its 
non-existence, I also concluded that the “policies” alleged to be adopted for its 
prevention and alleviation were ineffective.78  
No serious criticism or rebuttal statement has appeared since the publication 
of Miwa [2008]. In the discussion on the development and countermeasures toward the 
worldwide “financial crisis (or panic)” that became obvious since July 2007, not a few 
argued to learn from the Japanese experiences (including policy failures) of a decade 
ago. If the suggested Japanese “experiences” is the conventional wisdom that is based 
on misconceptions and misunderstanding on the basic facts of the reality both of the 
“financial crisis” that actually occurred in Japan and of adopted countermeasures and 
their effectiveness, misunderstandings might lead to another more grave confusion and 
                                                  
5  Borrowing with remaining term less than a year is classified as “short-term”, and 
otherwise as “long-term”. Total borrowing is the sum of “short-term” and “long-term”.   
6  For the details on this point, see pp.14~21 of Miwa [2008]. Observers have often 
referred to the DI (Diffusion Index) on “lending position of financial institutions” 
provided by the Bank of Japan as a supporting evidence of the serious “credit crunch”. I 
wrote there (p.18) as follows. The next 3rd point is the most important. “Do the 
questionnaire and the firm’s responses on which the DI is based include relevant and 
appropriate information positive users of this DI presume?” After careful examination, 
few would answer “YES” to this question, I predict. Unless being able to answer “YES” 
to this question, it must be impossible for reader to accept, upon a chart of this DI’s 
movement, the conventional wisdom that there was a serious “credit crunch”.     
7  With the collapse on 22 November 1997 of Yamaichi Securities, following the failure of 
Sanyo Securities on 3 and of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank on 17, the “financial crisis” 
reached full force in Japan, and that of Tokuyo City Bank on 26 followed. On December 
5 the Ministry of Finance announced to protect all the bank deposits and financial 
bonds until March 2001. On 12 January 1998 in his speech to Congress Prime Minister 
Hashimoto declared that Japan would not trigger a global financial panic. The 
government was forced to take the control both of The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan 
on 23 October 1998 and of the Bond Credit Bank of Japan on December 13. It was on 12 
March 1999 when the Financial Revitalizing Committee, created on 5 December 1998, 
decided the injection of public funds, ¥7.4592 trillion in total, to 15 banks. Even if the 
infusion worked well and played a critical role, already one year and four months had 
passed since November 1997. For more details, see the “Time-line of Events on 
Financial System: 1965-2002” in Nishimura [2003, pp.458-61].   
8  The discussion and conclusion of this research is based on firm-level data from 
Corporate Enterprise Quarterly Statistics. As a natural consequence, at least directly I 
do not study the influence of “credit crunch” on households, governments, financial 
institutions, or economic agents abroad.    6
tragedy (or comedy?).   
In size categories smaller than ¥600 million in paid-in capital, at the beginning 
of each fiscal year (in April) CEQStat randomly selects all the firms to survey, and Miwa 
[2008] focused on firms with firms with larger than ¥600 million in paid-in capital. 
Because of this circumscription, there remains a strong interest in a question: “Did the 
same conclusion apply to smaller firms with less than ¥600 million in paid-in capital? 
Was the situation different?” Some seem to be frustrated, arguing: “It was credit crunch 
or banks’ reluctance to lend to small businesses that was serious during that period, and 
it is off target like this study to focus only on large companies.”   
   As shown below soon, however, in 2004 the average number of employees in 
firms in category between ¥100 million~¥1 billion paid-in capital was below 200, and 
with more than ¥1 billion was slightly more than 1,000. Neither persuasive theoretical 
ground nor powerful empirical evidence has been presented to support and confirm the 
validity of the conventional wisdom: “There was a serious credit crunch, particularly to 
small businesses.” In Miwa [2008, pp.154-56], I tentatively countered to this kind of 
argument. 
    This research project began with a question: “Did the same conclusion apply to 
smaller firms with less than ¥600 million in paid-in capital? Was the situation 
different?” As all the firms surveyed are replaced every fiscal year, we cannot conduct 
completely the same investigation with firms in smaller size categories as in Miwa 
[2008]. 
  With the exception of listed (large) firms, it is not easy to collect firm-level 
information on corporate financing behavior. In Japan the Hojin Kigyo Tokei (Corporate 
Enterprise Statistics, CEStat), Quarterly and Annual, is the only well-balanced 
statistics on firm’s balance-sheet information like financing behavior, including small 
businesses (irrespective of its definition). Other frequently used information sources, 
such as “(customer) surveys” conducted by policy finance institutions or by Credit 
Guarantee Associations and its related organization like the CRD (Credit Rating 
Database) Association or various “researches” and “surveys” various government 
institutions like Small and Medium Enterprise Agency conduct when necessary, may 
naturally suffer from grave sample biases.9 Curiously enough, however, in Japan 
                                                  
9  For instance, it is dangerous, from a customer survey conducted in a bar, asking “Do 
you love beer?”, to straightforwardly draw a “conclusion” about the people’s preference 
of beer. Several decades ago, many foreign observers were fond of reports that 
emphasized the high-cost structure of inefficient Japanese distribution system, which 
however were primarily based on the surveys of selling prices of imported products in 
department store’s gift corners. Probably partly because of this, most foreign  7
well-known as a most committed country for small business policies I have little 
knowledge that the government has ever used positively the CEStat for the diagnosis of 
the necessity of small business policies, policy planning and implementation, or in 
evaluating  their  effectiveness.        
  The primary focus of this study is placed on small businesses rather than on 
big enterprises. Little well-balanced information has been presented concerning 
financing behavior of Japanese small businesses including borrowings from financial 
institutions, and therefore few know it in detail and accurately. With these two reasons, 
in this research I organize basic information about financing behavior of Japanese firms, 
focusing on small businesses.   
A basic premise to most studies of Japanese financial phenomena has been the 
dominant role played by banks. Hoshi and Kashyap [2001, p.310] wrote that banks 
“were the only game in town”. Observers argue that this bank dominance continued 
even after the “financial liberalization” of the 1980s, through which the largest firms 
obtained access to international capital market.   
  As shown in detail in DP1 (Discussion Paper 1), through the ages (for instance 
since the 1960s when the dual-economy view was widely accepted earnestly) the “Bank 
Dependence Ratio (borrowings from financial institutions/total assets)” of Japanese 
firms has been much lower than the conventional wisdom had presumed. In addition, 
recently (since the turn of the century in particular), the “Bank Dependence Ratio” 
further decreased drastically in firms of all size categories, which I call “further in 
crease in the ‘Independence of firms from Banks’”. Also, predicting to be able to easily 
confirm that the same conclusion of Miwa [2008] applies to small businesses (as shown 
below, it does), I reorganized the research design for this new project. As a consequence, 
I expand the focus from bank borrowings to deposits, receivables, payables, and 
inventory, and also their mutual relations.     
 
Extension of the study period: from FY1994 to the 2nd quarter of FY2009 
  Focusing on the “Credit Crunch” in 1997-1999, Miwa [2008] studied the data 
over 7 years, from FY1994 to FY2000. The present research extends the study period to 
FY1994~the 2nd Quarter of FY2009, 15 and half years. The world financial market has 
changed drastically, particularly since the 2nd half of the 1990s, which is widely believed 
to be one of the causes of the “financial crisis” since 2007 and its protracting serious 
impacts. In relation to the turbulent days, particularly since the “Lehman Shock” in the 
                                                                                                                                                  
distributors that entered the Japanese market exited in failure.              8
fall of 2008, the reality and policy responses in Japan during the “Lost Two Decades”, 
including the Japanese experience in its “Credit Crunch” in 1997-1999 gather wide 
attention, often calling them cynically the “Japanese lessons”. By extending the study 
period to the 2nd quarter of FY2009, we can study its impacts on firm’s financing 
behavior in Japan. In addition, we can study the effects of the long lasting “quantity 
easing monetary policy under zero-interest-rate”.    
  The conventional wisdom, dominant at least in Japan, argues that the recent 
“financial crisis” had influenced only slightly, if any, the Japanese economy, which 
differs substantially from that of the “financial crisis” or the “Credit Crunch” at the end 
of the 1990s. However, as shown in Miwa [2008] in Japan during 1997~1999 there was 
no clear sign of serious influence of the “Credit Crunch”, and during the recent 
“financial crisis” I find in every size category of firms a dramatic decrease both in 
receivables and payables, particularly in the third quarter of FY2008, that is 
immediately after the “Lehman Shock”.10   
  Under the historically unprecedented low-interest-rate policy of the Bank of 
Japan, the “Independence of Firms from Banks” further increased. Partly due to various 
policies toward bank’s reluctance to small business lending, the only exception was that 
the ratio of long-term borrowings to the total assets of small businesses on average did 
not decrease.   
 
Shift in research focus:   
From influence of shocks to search and organization of basic information   
  At any point of time during the period under study and in any firm size 
category, I find no clear relationship between the variation of short-term bank 
borrowings and the variation of any other financial variable, for instance. The only 
exception is the one between receivables and payables, where, at any point of time 
during the period under study and in any firm size category, both between the ratio of 
receivables to and payables to total assets and between the ratio of the change in the 
amount of receivables to and payables to total assets. I find close relationship 
(extremely high positive correlation coefficient). I find no similar relationship even 
between either of them and inventory. 
  In this study I use two types of variables. Suppose yit stands for the 
outstanding amount of financial item, short-term borrowings from financial institutions, 
for instance, and wt the total assets, at time t. The first one, hereafter I call “level 
                                                  
10  If we classify it as part of the “shadow banking system”, Japan suffered its serious 
contraction, we should say.    9
variable”, lit, is yit-1/wt-1 (*100), and the second one, “difference variable”, dit, is (yit-1 - 
yit)/wt-1 (*100), (to be explained below in [I&S-3]).   
Presuming that the “Credit Crunch” was serious and it made strong and clear 
impact on the Japanese firm’s financing behavior, Miwa [2008] used only the latter 
“difference variables” in order to focus on observations and signs that would be 
identified as the consequence of the shocks. Unfortunately, however, the “credit crunch” 
was not so serious and little information and signs of its shocks were clearly identified.  
As a consequence, in Miwa [2008] I concluded simply that the “Credit Crunch” in Japan 
in 1997-1999 had no clear impact on financing behavior of Japanese firms. However, I 
could conduct no further research beyond this.   
  In this research, I shift the research focus to the search and organization of 
basic information, as a foundation for investigating the firm’s choice among financing 
measures including borrowings from banks and trade credits. As a part, I focus also on 
the influence of the two “financial crises”, in 1997-1999 and since 2007. In this 
perspective, I expected to find much more from studying “level variables” rather than 
“difference variables”, and planned to pay more attention to the relationship between 
“level variables”.     
  For example, placing focus on my finding, detailed in DP1, that the ratio of 
zero-short-term-borrowing was very high among firms in every size category, has 
rapidly increased in the last decade, and the highest among the smallest firms, I divide 
firms in each size category into two groups, firms with zero-short-term-borrowing and 
firms with non-zero-short-term-borrowing. I compared these two groups at each point of 
time, with “level variables”, “difference variables”, and relationships between variables. 
Intriguingly enough, I find no clear difference between two groups at any point of time. 
This result may depress many readers who expect noteworthy differences between firms 
that (could) choose “Independence from Banks” and those that do not. 
  For readers’ and expositional convenience, I divide the study period, 15 and 
half years from FY1994 to the 2nd quarter of FY2009, into two parts, the first half of 8 
years up to FY2001 and the second half of 7 and half years from FY2002, and in many 
cases I calculate the period average values. For example, as the long lasting “quantity 
easing monetary policy under zero-interest-rate” has been maintained throughout the 
second half period under which the “Independence of Firms from Banks” further 
increased, those comparisons would provide some hints for understanding its sources 
and mechanism.   
 
Why  Hojin Kigyo Tokei (Corporate Enterprise Statistics, CEStat), CEQStat in  10
particular, is useful and informative? 
  Above all, CEStat, CEQStat in particular, provides basic information about 
financing behavior of firms that are on the demand side of financial market, rather than 
institutions in fund management like financial institutions on the supply side.   
  In discussion phenomena concerning economic confusion and stagnation of the 
Japanese economy during the “Lost Decades (or Two Decades)”, even when focusing on 
firm behavior, financing behavior in particular, typically the basic perspective adopted 
in the conventional wisdom has focused on the supply side of funds, particularly lending 
behavior of financial institutions including banks that have been recognized to 
dominate it. Obviously, however, firm’s source of funds is not limited to financial 
institutions (and shareholders).   
Funds borrowed by firms (households, governments, or foreign agents) from 
financial institutions are not always all used for their own business activities like 
production and facility investments (consumption, house construction, or various 
investments like R&D). Some of the borrowed funds may be invested in the financial 
market, used in increasing trade credits or obtaining shares in finance companies, 
which are finally obtained by firms on the demand side of the financial market. Firms 
use in financing necessary funds various financial markets where not only financial 
institutions but also many other types of agents including non-financial business firms 
take part in. In order to understand adequately the firm’s financing behavior, we should 
expand the focus of study from lending behavior of financial institutions to financial 
markets, and study their roles and functions. If financial institutions were reluctant to 
lend money to small businesses, as has been alleged earnestly in Japan, by way of 
financial markets money lend to other borrowers may finally reach those small 
businesses. We should focus on financing behavior of firms on the demand side of the 
markets rather than lending behavior of financial institutions on the supply side. For 
this purpose, CEStat, CEQStat in particular, is the most useful and informative.11 
Secondly, as mentioned above, CEStat (CEQStat) is the only random-sampled 
statistics in Japan that provides well balanced balance-sheet information about 
financing behavior of firms on the demand side of financial markets. On small 
businesses in particular, it is the only reliable statistics. 
Thirdly, CEQStat surveys outstanding amounts of items on firm’s balance 
                                                  
11  For questions like “What is ‘the banks’ reluctance to lend’?”, “How serious has it been 
in Japan?”, “What are the sources of trouble?”, and “What can we and should we do?”, 
see Miwa [2010a]. There may have been no such serious policy issues. Even when bank 
lending to small businesses has remarkably decreased, it may be because bank has lost 
the comparative advantage to competing business models or because it is inefficient.    11
sheet both at the beginning and at the end of each quarter (year for Nenpo, Annual 
Statistics), with which we see the actual amount of change in financial items during 
each quarter (year), for instance from April to June. In contrast, most other data-sets 
like securities filings of listed firms, Policy Investment Bank of Japan, or CRD are a 
collection of firm’s accounting (annual) reports. It is based on each firm’s choice of 
accounting term (year), which inevitably varies among firms. This variation and 
difference of period actually surveyed might be a decisive constraint, with which those 
data-set will be fatally misleading for investigating the reality and impact of “financial 
crisis” (or “credit crunch”), for instance. CEQStat (CEStat) is free from this variation. 
Fourthly, firms raise funds from a wide variety of sources, and, as shown below, 
the ratio of funds from financial institutions like banks to the total assets has not been 
so high as is widely perceived. Traditionally, however, at least in Japan primary source 
of financial data have been provided by the Bank of Japan, most of which is collected 
from financial institutions. As a result, they place the greatest focus on the activities of 
financial institutions, like bank lending and deposit. A wide variety of financial 
activities and transactions in financial markets tend to be out of their direct concern, 
and little information about so many important items on firm’s balance sheet is 
available in widely used financial data-set (or statistics). In contrast, by directly 
collecting data from financing firms, CEStat (CEQStat) provide rich information about 
items which have been neglected or viewed as unimportant by the authorities and 
researchers of financial markets. In this research, I place focus also on deposit, 
receivables, payables, and inventory. 
      
Advantage of firm-level data 
  In addition to the points mentioned above, this study enjoys an advantage of 
firm-level data. Reflecting various factors and constraints, financing behavior of firms is 
too complex and diverse to capture with aggregate values or sample mean values, 
assuming a representative firm in each size category. Although CEStat (CEQStat) 
collects useful and informative data, by publishing the results basically in aggregates 
values its potentials have not been fully exploited.12 By using firm-level data, we 
investigate in detail the issues beyond the reach of aggregate value data, and find 
valuable results. 
Among the interesting results of the present study, it is the finding and 
                                                  
12  Obviously, aggregate values published in reports are quite informative, as shown in 
Section 8 of DP1 ([1-8]), but those published aggregate values have not fully utilized in 
the previous literature.  12
verification with firm evidence of phenomena which I name “the Independence of Firms 
from Banks”, particularly of small businesses, that I consider to have the most 
important direct impact on the research of financial markets in Japan. Only with the 
firm-level data, I could find and confirm the phenomena.   
  The conventional wisdom, due to little interest of people including the financial 
authorities and researchers, argues roughly: “Trade credit is a financing method for 
inventory fund”. A simple study of relationship between outstanding values of inventory 
and trade credits (receivables and payables) with firm-level data raises serious doubts 
to this view, however. By liberating ourselves from the spell of this kind of conventional 
wisdom, we will be able to begin a real study of firm’s financing behavior, including 
trade credit and its relation with bank borrowings. 
 
Content and composition of this paper 
  In this research, I study the financing behavior of firms, rather than lending 
behavior of financial institutions. Using firm-level data from CEQStat, I could examine 
a wide variety of issues, including the validity of arguments which most existing 
researches have long accepted as obvious and actively used as their common grounds. 
Some of the most basic grounds of the conventional wisdom about the Japanese 
financial phenomena are found to be false, upon which I could design and conduct new 
researches.  
  From this perspective, the most important finding of this research, which is 
also the most basic ground of this research, is the “Low ‘Bank Dependence Ratio’ 
(=borrowings from financial institutions/ total assets)” and “Recent Further Increase in 
‘Independence of Firms from Banks’” which is clearly observed during the study period 
since FY1994, after the turn of the century in particular. The view, symbolically written 
in Hoshi and Kashyap [2001, p.310] that banks “were the only game in town”, is widely 
accepted and remains as the conventional wisdom not only about the financial market 
in Japan before the (alleged) process of “financial liberalization” in the 1980s bust also 
about most Japanese firms at present with the exception of small number of 
exceptionally excellent big companies which are allowed to use bond markets effectively. 
In contrast, however, ever since the 1960s the Bank Dependence Ratio of firms in every 
size category has been consistently much lower than had been widely perceived. During 
the study period, firm-level data show that in every size category the ratio of firms with 
zero borrowing (irrespective of whether it is short-term, long-term, or their sum) is 
extremely high and has consistently increased. Among firms with non-zero borrowing 
the bank dependence ratio has consistently varied markedly, and has recently decreased  13
in chorus.   
  This tendency is more obvious among firms in smaller size categories where 
the firms are recognized to have no other sources of funding than banks than among 
larger firms some of which with “liberalization” have become able to rely heavily on 
capital markets.   
  In DP1 I confirm in detail the “Low Bank Dependence of Japanese Firms” and 
the “Recent Further Increase in the ‘Independence of Firms from Banks’” and discuss 
their implications (briefly I discuss the implications below soon in [I&S-2]). These 
observations imply that one of the most basic assumptions of research and 
understanding of financial phenomena and policies and regulations related to financial 
markets has been a myth substantially deviating from the reality. As shown in [I-1], the 
long-lasting policy debates about “banks’ reluctance to (small business) lending”, which 
symbolizes the “Lost Two Decades” (policy) controversy, might be groundless or based on 
a wrong assumption.   
  Beyond those points, focusing also on deposits, DP1 investigates the reality of 
firm (borrower)-bank (lender) relationship, its transformation and variations. The firm’s 
“Low Bank Dependence” has not suddenly materialized in the 1990s. In the present 
study I used firm-level data for FY1994 and FY2009, so that using published summary 
statistics from Corporate Enterprise Annual Statistics (CEAStat) in [I-8] I show 
supporting evidence since the 1960s with long-run level and trend in Firm’s Bank 
Dependence Ratio.   
  Placing the primary focus on smaller businesses in this study I intended to 
confirm the conclusion on Miwa [2008] about the reality of the “Credit Crunch, 
1997-1999” to hold also with small businesses. However, it is to be seriously influenced 
by the “noise” that so many firms under study have zero-change in the outstanding 
amount of short-term borrowing from financial institutions, which is the primary focus 
of attention in Miwa [2008]. In addition, I find also the overwhelming majority of those 
firms with zero-change in short-term borrowing have no outstanding amount of 
short-term bank borrowing both at the beginning and end of the term. Without paying 
attention to this “noise” I studied the reality of “Credit Crunch” in Miwa [2008]. With 
two reasons, however, the influence of this omission of attention is rather slight. First, 
this further increase in “Independence of Firms from Banks” is remarkable in the 21st 
century in particular, and Miwa [2008] studied the period from FY1994 to FY2000. 
Second, this firm’s “Low Bank Dependence” is more spectacular among smaller 
businesses rather than among large businesses Miwa [2008] studied. 
  DP2 first investigates the ratios of zero-short-term-bank-borrowing firms and  14
their time-dependent change. Then, separating-off the influence of those firms and 
focusing only on those firms with non-zero-short-term-bank-borrowing it investigates 
the reality of the “Credit Crunch” and confirms that the conclusion of Miwa [2008] 
applies to every size category of firms. After this, it also executes the same investigation 
on receivables, payables, and inventory (DI1 does the same on deposits).   
  DP3 and DP4 are for “The Reality of Trade Credit and its Link with Bank 
Borrowing and Inventory”. Firm’s “Low Bank Dependence” and recent further increase 
in its “Independence from Banks” imply that the predominant focus traditionally placed 
on firm’s relationship with financial institutions, particularly bank borrowing, would be 
inappropriate and misleading in studying firm’s financing behavior. When we table it as 
inappropriate, however, with the following basic puzzles, a huge variety of issues for 
investigation newly emerge: “What then are the alternative sources of funds?” “What 
are their relationships with bank borrowing?” and “What was the reality of ‘Credit 
Crunch’ and ‘financial crisis’?” 
  The conventional wisdom has placed predominant focus on financial 
institutions, big banks in particular, in research and discussion on firm’s financing 
behavior and more broadly on financial markets, which has strictly conditioned policy 
debates over financial markets. With this favoritism to banks or bank-oriented policy 
environment (“bank-centralism”?), firm’s other financing means than bank borrowing 
have gathered only poor attention both of researchers and regulators, resulting in little 
information collection about related issues and poor accumulation of theoretical and 
empirical researches.   
  “Trade Credit” has long been widely recognized in Japan as credit instruments 
that “large firms” enjoying advantageous position in financial markets under the “dual 
structure” have adopted in supplying credit to disadvantaged “small businesses”. It is, 
therefore, a result of arbitration generated by the “dual-structure” in financial markets, 
the conventional wisdom argues. This view, in collaboration with the “bank-centralism” 
(these two are the two sides of the same coin), has fatally impeded appropriate problem 
setting on related issues. As “shadowy figures”, trade credit has gathered little attention, 
with poor accumulation of relevant information including statistics, with which 
research and discussion on relevant issues has little developed. Consequently, beyond a 
door newly opened by this research, there appears a rich research field, to be called 
“undiscovered wilderness (fertile land)” or “the dark (unknown or unexploited) 
continent of corporate finance”, which throw us into a stupor, wondering where and how 
to launch the investigation. Of course, little information or understanding has been 
accumulated on the development of trade credit during the period of credit squeeze  15
policy and the “Credit Crunch” and their relationship with borrowing from banks. 
  In this research, because of its popularity, size, and data availability, as the 
first step toward alternative sources of funds, I focus on “trade credit” like receivables 
and payables. In DP3, the first half of trade credit study, subtitled “Overall Discussion 
and Preliminary Investigation”, first using aggregate summary statistics from CEAStat 
I review the long-run trends in relevant observations, and next as a preliminary 
investigation I generally discuss the mutual relationship among trade credit, borrowing 
from financial institutions, and inventory. On that basis, as the first step of 
investigating the relationships among relevant variables I compare the two groups of 
firms, firms with non-zero-short-term-bank borrowing at the beginning of the term 
(type A) and firms with zero-borrowing (type B).   
In DP4, subtitled “Correlation Coefficients and Multiple Regressions”, first I 
study correlation coefficients between variables, and find that with the sole exception of 
the ones between receivables and payables almost nowhere and at no time I find high 
correlation coefficients between financial variables, like between short-term bank 
borrowing and receivables, payables, or inventory. Focusing on this sole exception of 
consistently high correlation coefficients between receivables and payables, I run 
multiple regressions both on their “level variables” and “difference variables”. In either 
case the relationship between dependent variable and regressors are consistently stable 
and similar, in that the regression coefficients, t-values, and Adjusted R-squares are 
consistently stable and similar.       
 
Objectives and characters of this research 
  It has long been the conventional wisdom about the Japanese firms and the 
economy that financial institutions, big banks in particular, dominate the financial 
markets where firm’s financing behavior decisively depends on borrowing from those 
institutions. As the dominant view it has maintained an overwhelmingly strong 
influence on research and policy debates in related fields. This view as a basic 
foundation has definitively conditioned the relevant researches and policy debates. The 
low “Bank Dependence” of Japanese firms and recent further increase in their 
“Independence from Banks”, to be detailed in DP1, implies that this foundation is a 
misconception and misunderstanding, that is, it is a myth that fatally deviates from the 
reality of the Japanese financial markets. 
  This research begins with this finding, which is like a discovery of the New 
World or a continent widely believed not to exist. Under the predominance of the 
conventional wisdom, the financial markets in Japan has been like a vast desert where  16
without a close relationship with one of big banks that provide support, assistance, and 
guarantee any firm is unable either to pursue normal activities or to survive. The new 
finding implies that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, in the Japanese financial 
markets it is not indispensable to establish and maintain a close relationship with a 
bank not only to survive but also actively pursue normal activities. Thus, this research 
begins with a major discovery, a breakthrough. 
  Upon this major discovery, putting the conventional wisdom on the shelf, in 
DP1, I focus on the relationship between firms and financial institutions and organize 
information about related issues. In DP2, taking deposit, receivables, payables, and 
inventory, together with bank borrowing, into consideration, I organize information 
concerning both the ratio of each item i to total assets, lit=yit-1/wt-1, and the ratio of 
change in each item i to total assets, dit=(yit-1 – yit)/wt-1. Here, as part of the investigation, 
I go into the details of the reality in Japan of the “Credit Crunch” in 1997-1999, the 
“financial crisis” since 2007, and the long-lasting extreme-easy-money policy. 
   Once we recognize the low “Bank Dependence of Firms” and recent further 
increase in “Firm’s Independence from Banks”, it is natural for many to newly direct 
their attention to the details of alternative financing measures and the relationship 
between them and bank borrowing. Focusing both on “trade credit” like receivables and 
payables as representative alternative financing measures and on inventory which the 
conventional wisdom argues to be a major application of trade credit, DP3 and DP4 
investigate their realities and mutual relationships. Under the overwhelming influence 
of the conventional wisdom about the financial markets, however, “trade credit” has 
been “a shadowy figure”. Most people have known it as an expression, but neither have 
had clear image nor recognized its reality in detail.   
  Consequently, little information was available as its basis and preparation, 
with which I had to start this new exploration. This research could be a report of 
blind-way-exploration only to collect and organize relevant information. This part of the 
study is neither a hypothesis testing based on careful theoretical discussion nor an 
exploration with well-defined destination and objective, although it might be useful as 
its preparation and basis. The discussion covers a wide variety of issues, and with the 
exception of several conclusions on the errors of the conventional wisdom it neither 
enumerates “conclusions” nor shows a “summary”. Collection and organization of basic 
information about “trade credit”, which not only has rarely been seriously investigated 
but also not very often has come to an issue, would initiate the interest of many readers. 
  For example, during the recent “financial crisis”, often we heard a commentary: 
“Because the shadow-banking system is undeveloped, what has become apparent in  17
financial market in the US and Europe in the last decade is a problem of the remote 
future in Japan.” Right and wrong of the big changes that occurred in the world 
financial market that preceded the “financial crisis” is not an issue here. The reality of 
its relation to the financial market in Japan and the investigation of the conventional 
wisdom about related points are not, either. Recognizing the low “Bank Dependence of 
Firms” and the recent further increase in “Independence of Firms from Banks”, many 
readers in earnest would raise puzzles: Where and how firms obtain funds for their 
activities, other than borrowing from banks?; Have the same kinds and types of changes 
and transformation occurred “there” in Japan, too?; Isn’t the relative stability in the 
Japanese market during the recent financial crisis just by accident or simply 
unrecognized by many? In order to secure the stability of financial system, and smooth 
operation of the Japanese economy, it must be definitely important to explore “the dark 
continent of finance” that widely extends outside the traditional “financial sector” 
comprised of financial institutions of the traditional type.   
  I really hope the development of future research over a wide variety of issues 
on the causes, generating mechanism, and influence of the low “Bank Dependence of 
Firms” and recent further increase in “Firm’s Independence from Banks” in Japan.   
  I discuss the implications of this research in the next section.         
      
Roadmap 
  The objective of this research is a full-fledged organization of basic information 
about financing behavior of Japanese firms, small businesses in particular, critically 
reviewing the dominant view or the conventional wisdom about related issues. 
Consequently, it covers a wide variety of issues and directly draws few clear 
“conclusions”, with which it does not fit in so easily with a brief summary. [I&S-2] 
discusses the implication of the results, important research agenda for future research 
and discussion this research would provoke and their potential achievements. [I&S-3] 
briefly introduces the Corporate Enterprise Quarterly Statistics (CEQStat) and its data, 
with basic statistics, and variables I use in this research. Each section from [I&S-4] to 
[I&S-7] introduces four discussion papers, DP1~DP4, respectively. In place of summary 
of investigation, [I&S-8], entitling “Interesting Observations”, lists points and 
observations that I found on the process of the study and still remain impressive and 
interesting to the author at its close, which I believe useful for readers in understanding 
the importance and in promoting the use of basic information about financing behavior 
of the Japanese firms, small businesses in particular, organized in the report. 
[Appendix] includes “abstracts” of 4 DPs.    18
[I&S-2]. Implication 
 
[I&S-2] discusses the implication of the results of this research. As the process 
up to this point has already been long, steep, and tough, for a reader in a hurry it might 
be better to leap to [I&S-3] and after (or after having a glimpse of the whole report), and 
then return to this “Implication”.   
 
Two basic points for this research   
  Upon two basic points this research conducts a full-fledged organization of 
basic information about financing behavior of Japanese firms, small businesses in 
particular, critically reviewing the dominant view or the conventional wisdom about 
related issues. 
  The conventional wisdom that financial institutions, big banks in particular, 
have dominated the Japanese financial market and played there the key roles has long 
been an obvious basic assumption in research and policy debate over the Japanese 
financial phenomena. First, this research begins with pointing out that this 
conventional wisdom is and has been a misunderstanding and misconception, a myth 
fatally deviating from the reality. Consequently, from the start to the end, the content of 
this research has a wide variety of and grave implications both to research and policy 
discussion on financial market issues. 
  Among the sectors obtaining funds from the market, corporate sector, therefore 
firms, small businesses in particular, has gathered the greatest interest both of the 
researchers and policy makers. Second, at least partly because of the stable dominance 
of the conventional wisdom as a foundation in research and policy debate in Japan, 
CEStat, CEQStat in particular, that provides relevant statistical information by far of 
the best quality, has rarely been used effectively in research on financial phenomena or 
policy debate. It is extremely productive to show in detail that active use of CEStat, its 
firm-level data in particular, is effective in escaping from confusion, chaos, and calamity 
based on the misconceptions. In light of the predominance of the conventional wisdom 
in Japan, this second point might be the most basic message of this research. 
  Consequently, this research covers a wide variety of issues and directly draws 
few clear “conclusions”. It provides a set of basic information that would provoke 
important research agenda for future research and discussion, leading to great 
achievements. Therefore, the list of implications shown below can not be exhaustive, 
but just part of candidates with great potentials. Obviously, they are not “conclusions” 
drawn from the research.    19
   
If the conventional wisdom is a myth that substantially deviates from the reality… 
  It has been the conventional wisdom that financial institutions, particularly 
big banks, have long dominated the Japanese financial markets where they played 
overwhelmingly important roles. Most issues discussed in this research are related with 
the conclusion that this conventional wisdom is a myth that has fatally deviated from 
the reality. 
  As shown in DP1, during the study period of FY1994~FY2009, after the turn of 
the century in particular, the “Independence of Firms from Banks” dramatically 
increased. Even in the 1960s, the heyday of the “dual economy” theory, the firm’s “Bank 
Dependence Ratio” was not so high as was widely perceived, which had remarkably 
decreased before the beginning of the 1980s, even before the “Bubble Years”.   
  The conventional wisdom argues that, with the “liberalization” of the Japanese 
financial market in the 1980s, outstandingly excellent super-big companies (by far 
bigger than the most firms with more than ¥600 million in paid-in capital surveyed in 
Miwa [2008]) became able to actively use capital market through issuing securities like 
SB, CB, and WB, resulting both in the increase in their “Independence from Banks” and 
in the emergence and expansion of the bubble. Those excellent big companies evaded 
the banks’ monitoring and banks in turn were obliged to make huge loans to unknown 
borrowers. Those two factors interdependently emerged the huge “Bubble”, with which 
as a consequence banks were to have troubles with huge amount of bad loans.13 
  In this view, it is only outstandingly excellent big companies that could become 
“Independent from Banks”. It is important to note that it implies that the conventional 
wisdom remains dominant even today, for which it has been a basic assumption that for 
instance for small businesses “banks are the only game in town”. Up until the present it 
has been unclear on what theoretical and empirical grounds this view was proposed and 
obtained a wide support.14 As shown in DP1, the view as a basic assumption of this 
conventional has never been valid since the 1960s. During the study period of this 
research, it was small businesses that the most drastically increased the “Independence 
from Banks”. Although in this research I do not explore the relationship between the 
increase in the “Independence from Banks” of Japanese firms including small 
businesses and the “liberalization”, it is implausible that the “Independence” would not 
                                                  
13  This view, however, is a myth fatally deviated from the reality. On the unreality of 
this conventional wisdom about the rise and fall of the Japanese “Bubble”, see Miwa 
and Ramseyer [2005a], or in brief Chapter 1 of Miwa and Ramseyer [2007].   
14  On this point briefly, see [I-1] of DP1.  20
have increased without the “liberalization”.   
  At least since the 1960s15  the “Bank Dependence Ratio” of Japanese firms was 
low and has consistently decreased. Since the bust of “Bubbles”, particularly during the 
long lasting “quantity easing monetary policy” in the 21st century, the Ratio decreased 
further. Up until the present the conventional wisdom has adopted as an obvious 
assumption an overwhelmingly high “Bank Dependence Ratio” (and also it assumes 
that before the “liberalization” competition among financial institutions had been 
effectively restricted), in which each firm has been assumed as if it were a fish fed in a 
pond maintained and controlled by each financial institution.16 From this assumption, 
following 5 views emerge, which in total constitute the conventional wisdom. 
 
(1)  It is not easy for firms, particularly for small businesses, to be in a privileged 
pond prepared by a big bank. When allowed, small businesses are treated as 
marginal members and often suffer major damage from bank’s reluctance to 
lend to small businesses.   
(2)  Being nervous for disadvantageous treatment, small business tends to avoid a 
privileged pond prepared by a big bank or to make access to other ponds 
prepared by other banks simultaneously. Moreover, when the fear rises to the 
surface, it is necessary to move to another pond. Such countermeasures are not 
easy to adopt and incur a huge additional cost. 
(3)  Asymmetric information between lending bank and borrowing firm plays a 
critical role, with which it is not easy for borrowers to move across ponds. Firms 
intending to move across ponds fatally suffer from the well-known adverse 
selection mechanism. In addition, because of this information asymmetry, 
maintaining lender-borrower relationship with many banks incurs tremendous 
cost. 
(4)  The performance and even the survival of a firm heavily depend on the 
establishment and maintenance of a close trade-relationship with a specific 
bank. Close relationship with a bank, often called keiretsu relationship, main 
bank relationship, or relationship banking, is in both of their interests, has 
prevailed widely particularly in Japan. It is one of the key components of the 
“Japanese economic system” that enabled the postwar economic recovery and 
                                                  
15  It seems the situation was the same even before the 1960s. For the situation in 
prewar Japan, see Miwa and Ramseyer [2002]. Because of the availability of the 
consistent data from CEAStat, I go back only to the 1960s.   
16  For a recent standard view, the conventional wisdom, about the “state of and 
problems in small business finance”, see Shimizu [2010].    21
development in Japan.   
(5)  Close bank-firm trade relationship, prevalent between big bank and big 
company in particular, has achieved great results. Concerning small businesses, 
it should have been a big policy concern to promote establishing close bank-firm 
relationships. With recent “relationship-banking” promotion policy, the benefit 
of this relationship has begun to spill over to small businesses that had little 
enjoyed it.   
 
Over at least half a century, including the days from the high-growth and prosperity to 
the stagnation often expressed as “the Lost Two Decades”, as a basic assumption this 
conventional wisdom has dominated the research and policy debates about the 
Japanese financial market. With this research, both this conventional wisdom and the 
above mentioned views based on it will lose the grounds. They will be pushed for a 
serious re-examination.17 
  One of the expressions that symbolize the Japanese economy after the burst of 
“Bubble”, often called “the Lost Two Decades”, is the “banks reluctance to lend” 
(kashishiburi). Despite of long lasting severe condemnation against banks, a series of 
small business policies including “coercion” of bank lending to small businesses, and 
expansion and further alleviation in conditions for “credit guarantee”, the 
condemnation against banks’ reluctance to lend has little decreased. It might be because 
of a wrong diagnosis that it is a “disease”, with which adopted treatments have been 
ineffective. Even for most small businesses, their “Bank Dependence Ratio” has been 
lower than the level the conventional wisdom had assumed, and recently they increased 
further their “Independence from Banks”. A straightforward interpretation of this 
observation, detailed in DP1, might be that it is because other financing measures 
available for firms are more profitable than bank borrowings, to which it is profitable 
for banks not to challenge”.18 
                                                  
17  It is generally understood that the influence of “asymmetric information” between 
lender and borrower is above all serious for small businesses. In Japan, however, in 
most cases bank lending to firms, including small businesses, have been executed on 
condition that borrowers pledge collateral or personal security, with which trading 
parties have avoided the influence of “asymmetric information”. On this point, see 
Section 4 of Miwa [2010a]. Often emphasized “bank monitoring” has rarely played a 
critical role. On the overvaluation of monitoring function of Japanese banks, 
symbolically that of “main banks”, see Chapter 7 of Miwa and Ramseyer [2007], 
especially 7-10, or in brief Chapter 4 of Miwa and Ramseyer [2006].   
18  Obviously, it does not deny or reject an interpretation like “it is because banks are 
reluctant to lend to firms” or “banks impose too strict lending conditions”. However, 
reader should ask “Why banks do not lend?” “Why banks lose market by imposing too  22
 
If the assumed position and role of banks in financial market is overrated…. 
  The conventional wisdom about the overwhelmingly important position and 
role in the Japanese financial market of financial institutions, banks in particular, has 
been a myth substantially deviating from the reality. It implies that the conventional 
interests, concerns, and hopes about banks, particularly big banks, and their behavior 
have been overrated. 
  For instance, the “Financial Crisis” or “Credit Crunch” in Japan at the close of 
the 1990s seems more to be a “crisis” or panic of financial institutions and financial 
administration. Overvaluing the influence of “collapse” of several financial institutions 
including big banks, the government postponed the enforcement of necessary measures 
in order to avoid their realization. In the upshot, (emphasizing that there is little 
possibility of such kind of occurrence, or using it as an excuse) the government that had 
prepared little countermeasure, and the public, had to face a series of financial 
institution’s collapses and grave policy confusion. As shown both in Miwa [2008] and 
DP2 of this research, at least from borrowing firms on the fund raising side, I do not find 
prominent phenomena to be recognized as an indication of “Credit Crunch”.19 
  It is not because the government adopted appropriate policies that worked 
effectively. A series of collapse of financial institutions began in the fall of 1997. It was 
on 5 December 1998 when the Financial Revitalizing Committee was created based on 
newly established two Financial Stabilization Acts, and it was on 12 March 1999 this 
Committee decided the injection of public funds, ¥7.4592 trillion in total, to 15 banks.20 
                                                                                                                                                  
strict conditions?”, and “Will it improve national welfare to criticize banks behavior as 
‘reluctance to lend’ and enforce policies as its countermeasures?” Suppose a consumer on 
an empty stomach, who with no money asked a restaurant to feed adequately and was 
refused, criticizes the restaurant: “You have a huge stock of food… It’s a restaurant’s 
reluctance to sell!” It may be informative and useful to ask, “What difference is there?” 
On this illustration, see the discussion entitled “‘reluctance to lend’ or ‘reluctance to 
borrow’?” at the end of [1]. Introduction in Miwa [2010a]. Furthermore, coercing banks 
to increase lending to small businesses as a countermeasure might be like coercing 
department stores that in response to the rise of discount stores pulled cameras and 
home electric appliances from their shelves to put them all back or to increase their 
sales radically. It might be only those involved in the “banks’ reluctance to lend” fiasco, 
together with politicians and government sections in charge, who are happy with the 
policy. For most (potential) borrowers and lenders, and also for most of the public, it 
might be a symbol of waste and against their interest. 
19  Note that this research is based on firm-level data from CEQStat. I do not take into 
consideration the influence on other agents such as households and the governments.   
20  See the above note 7 for a brief course of development. Reader should ask carefully: 
“Did the public fund injection worked effectively and greatly contribute to the ‘financial 
stability’?” and “Did this injection improve the national welfare?” If the “disease” this  23
  Both the fear of collapses of financial institutions including jusen (housing loan 
companies), big banks in particular, and the seriousness of its influence and confusion 
might have been overrated, or intentionally exaggerated. Upon a wrong assumption 
that is simply a “myth”, its often emphasized “cost” associated with the well-known 
expression, “too big to fail”, had been left unexamined and without careful evaluation.21 
 
“Disposal of bad loans” and policies against “banks’ reluctance to lend” 
  It was once a fashion in Japan to call financial institutions that in effect went 
bankrupt but survived with the protection, assistance, or policy of the government 
“zombie banks”.22 There has been a strong and wide support to the view that the 
survival of financial institutions once fell into bankruptcy but stayed in business with 
the government intervention has been one of the causes of long lasting stagnation in the 
Japanese economy since the 1990s. Those two observations seem to be based on 
overvaluation of the position and role of financial institutions, big banks in particular. 
  During the period from the late 1990s to the 1st half of the 2000s, the Japanese 
government enthusiastically promoted as “the top priority of tasks in economic policy” 
and coerced financial institutions “the disposal of bad loans”, which however might have 
fundamental flaw of the same kind and should be reviewed carefully. In Japan “zombie 
lending” became more popular than “zombie banks”. It placed more focus on “lending” 
behavior of banks as lenders than on their “obligation” of banks as borrowers.23 
Although none of the exact meaning, generating mechanism, or correspondence with 
“zombie banks” is clear, it seems to focus on the “slow speed” of “bad loan” disposal by 
                                                                                                                                                  
“treatment” targeted (or alleged to target) was slight or non-existent, the performance 
evaluation of the treatment would be minor (or negative).   
21  Readers who wonder that, although so many love to refer to the phrase, “too big to 
fail”, too few go into its details and necessary measures for its prevention should see 
John Kay, “‘Too big to fail’ is too dumb to keep” Financial Times, 28 Oct. 2009.   
22  According to Calomiris and Mason [2004, p.409], Kane[1998, p.5] for the first time 
used the expression of “‘zombie’ banks”, meaning that “can continue almost indefinitely, 
and it is very hard to measure their insolvency”. He explains a “zombie” institution: “Its 
ability to renew its deposit funding and its foreign debt depends entirely on the 
continuing credibility of the explicit and implicit government guarantees that official 
policies attach to its obligations”. Fukao [1998] that includes “zombie bank” in its title 
use this expression with explanation (p.50): “A financial institution that, after once 
falling into bankruptcy, stays in business without management discipline, like a 
zombie”.  
23  I leave to readers to the comparison and examination of relationship between 
“‘zombie’ banks” of Kane[1998] and “zombie lending” of Cabarello, Hoshi, and Kashyap 
[2006], and their related definitions and explanations.    24
financial institutions.24 
  As a policy against “banks’ reluctance to lend” to small businesses, in Japan 
since the 2nd half of the 1990s small business policies have been implemented in a scope 
wider and in a scale larger than in the 1960s, the hey day of the “dual economy” theory. 
With the recent reduction in the size of public works expenditure that has consistently 
been allocated preferentially to small businesses, small business policies have increased 
the weight of financial policy measures, particularly by expanding the size and scope of 
“credit guarantee” policies. “The Special Credit Guarantee Policy” during 
1998.10~2001.3 is the most representative. Again, this policy scheme is based on the 
conventional wisdom about the overwhelmingly important position and role of financial 
institutions, big banks in particular, which is also based on the “dual economy” theory 
drawn from an assumption (obviously infeasible and implausible, it seems) that 
financial institutions as a concerted action maintain discriminatory actions against 
small businesses.25 
 
Consequence of too much emphasis on and favoritism toward banks, “bank centralism”?   
The authority and government agencies in Japan like the Bank of Japan, 
Financial Service Agency, and Small and Medium Enterprise Agency view and 
recognize the reality and working of financial markets placing primary focus on 
traditional types of financial institutions, upon which they design and implement 
relevant policies. We should pay attention also to its serious consequence.   
Most basic information on finance including financial statistics have been 
collected through relevant “financial institutions”, with which primary focus is placed 
on or limited to information related to traditional type of financial institutions, 
representatively banks. However, in relation to firm’s financing behavior, the position 
and role of traditional financial institutions was not so prominent as had been assumed, 
and recently it has further decreased dramatically which I call the further increase in 
                                                  
24  On related issues associated with such expressions as “balance-sheet depression”, 
“‘zombie lending’ and the long-term stagnation of the Japanese economy in the 1990s”,   
and “‘zombie companies’ as a cause of long-term stagnation” see Miwa [2008, pp.163~66].   
In association with the last expression, the government enthusiastically implemented 
“disposal of bad loans” policy. The title of Cabarello et als [2006], well-known with the 
expression of “zombie lending”, is “Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in 
Japan”. This is an empirical study based on the theory that “[b]y keeping these 
unprofitable borrowers (that we call ‘zombies’) alive, the banks allowed them to distort 
competition throughout the rest of the economy”(p.3). This is not the place for its review, 
however. 
25  See Miwa [2010a] for the details of the reality, function, and roles of “credit 
guarantee” policy including the “Special Credit Guarantee Policy”.    25
firm’s “Independence from Banks”. Naturally, it is necessary to review and restructure 
the present information collection scheme on various aspects including the span of 
objectives, the scope of information, and the allocation of focus and priority. 
For instance, in discussing the influence on the Japanese economy of recent 
“financial crisis” and relevant policies, too much emphasis might have been placed on 
big financial institutions and their direct trade partners. Even if in Japan “the 
shadow-banking system” has not yet developed so remarkably as in the US and Europe, 
most Japanese firms obtain overwhelming portion of their funds from outside the 
“banking system”, too.26 Although unexplored yet, as shown below, in Japan recently 
including the period of “financial crisis”, particularly in the 3rd quarter of FY2008, 
immediately after the Lehman Shock, the outstanding amount of receivables and 
payables has decreased dramatically in every size category of firms. 
Money-supply indices, attention-grabbing in relation to macro monetary policy, 
are basically the aggregates of financial institution’s deposit to the central bank and 
cash, or deposits as their liabilities. The primary reason of focus on those indices, at 
least in Japan, is the conventional wisdom, accepted as an obvious assumption, about 
the overwhelmingly important position and role of financial institutions, particularly 
banks, in the financial market. Once doubts on this assumption arise, it would be of 
great concern to review the role and appropriateness of those indices. It also would be 
important to investigate the mechanism and influence of the recent further increase in 
firm’s “Independence from Banks”, particularly in the 2000s under the long lasting 
“quantity easing monetary policy” on a magnificent scale. 
                                                  
26  Like “non-bank”, the expression of “the shadow-banking system” also 
straightforwardly reflects the “bank centralism”. For the expression of “the 
shadow-banking system”, see Lo [2009]. Professor Lo is a prominent scholar in the field 
related to hedge funds, and this is a revised version of written testimony submitted to 
the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform for 
its November 13, 2008 Hearing on Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk. Many observers 
point out the defect of the traditional BIS-type regulation, micro-prudence regulation, 
that place primary focus on regulation of individual financial institutions, 
representatively banks. In response, it brings growing attention to regulations on a 
wider category of “financial institutions”, macro-prudence regulation, with which the 
primary attention of regulators and the public is directed to ensure stability in the 
overall short-term financial market focusing on “liquidity” supply. Hostile sentiment 
and wariness of the public over “the shadow-banking system” including hedge funds 
sympathizes with it. Under such a situation, he boldly and interestingly argues that 
there is little connection between the recent “crisis” and the behavior of hedge-funds, 
and that it is the “shadow hedge fund system”, in which financial institutions, like 
banks, insurance companies, and MMF, were engaged in hedge-fund-like investments 
and unprepared for the magnitude of losses in their portfolios caused by the U.S. 
residential real-estate market, who received the government’s bailout efforts (p.13).        26
The “bank centralism”, or the choice of placing too much emphasis on and 
favoritism on banks, in research and policy debates over the financial market must 
become an urgent issue for careful review.   
 
Importance of financing measures other than borrowing from financial institutions 
  Firm’s “Bank Dependence Ratio” has been lower than assumed by the 
conventional wisdom, and recently its “Independence from Banks” has further 
increased dramatically. As a result, the reality of financing measures other than 
borrowing from financial institutions and relationship between financing measures 
become a great concern.   
In this research I begin the study along this direction, but only focusing on 
trade credit, that is, receivables and payables and organizing basic information about 
them. Recognizing that “we could proceed only to this extent, even with the best 
available firm-level data from CEQStat”, new research programs would begin along this 
direction, I hope.   
   
Study of recent events and evaluation of related policies 
  Comparing with the one until the 1980s, the financial market in postwar Japan 
since the burst of the “Bubble” has been roller-coaster and a series of close encounters 
with new unknown phenomena. 
  The dominant view (diagnosis) of the impacts of various events and 
enforcement of countermeasures (treatment) have been based on the conventional 
wisdom about the Japanese financial market established in the 1960s at the latest, 
which assumes as obvious the overwhelmingly important position and role of financial 
institutions, banks in particular, in the financial market. As this conventional wisdom is 
a myth which has fatally deviated from the reality, most of those diagnoses and 
treatments have had great possibilities of being in error. At least, we need a careful 
review. 
  The reality of “Credit Crunch” or “financial crisis” since the end of 1997, the 
influence of “financial crisis” since 2007, and the effectiveness and influence of 
ultraeasy credit policy under low-interest rate that has been maintained since the 
beginning of the 2000s are part of the issues for careful review. The same applies to the 
policy measures for the so-called “jusen  problem”.    
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[I&S-3]. Data and Variables 
 
  In this research I use firm-level data from the Corporate Enterprise Quarterly 
Statistics (CEQStat), with the exception of the parts on long-run trend where I use 
summary statistics from the Corporate Enterprise Annual Statistics (CEAStat). 
CEQStat classifies firms into 5 size categories, in the size of paid-in capital at the 
beginning of fiscal year. 5 categories are, 10~20, 20~50, 50~100, 100~1,000, respectively 
in million yen, and more than ¥1 billion. Hereafter, I use notation from 5 to 9, 
respectively, for each size category (v4), and often I use 6 figures (or tables), one for all 
firms and 5 for firms in each size category. CEQStat calls the firms in 3 smaller 
categories “small firms (literally, small and medium firms)”, those in v4=8 “mid-sized”, 
and those in v4=9 “big firms”.     
  CEQStat is a sample survey, whose sample rates greatly differ across size 
categories. As a result, summary statistics over all the samples surveyed, depending on 
the sample rates and the sampling method, do not reflect the composition of population. 
CEQStat randomly samples approximately the following number of firms from each size 
category: v4=5, 4,000; v4=6, 4,000; v4=7, 2,000; v4=8, 10,00027  ; and v4=9, all firms. 
  For instance, the situation of the survey in the 3rd quarter in FY2004 is as 
follows. 
 
Situation of the Survey: 3rd Quarter of FY2004 (Oct.-Dec. in 2004)
Paid-in Capital (\million） 10～99 100～999 1,000~ total
Number of Firms Surveyed 9,630 9,930 5,761 25,321
Number of Respondents 6,584 8,129 5,333 20,046
Response rate （％） 68.4 81.9 92.6 79.2  
  With the exception of the category for the big firms (v4=9) where survey is a 
census, CEQStat is a sample survey in which the samples surveyed are all renewed at 
the beginning of each fiscal year, at the beginning of April. All the sample firms are 
requested to report over 4 quarters on items (primarily financial items) both at the 
beginning and the end of the quarter. Therefore, with the exception of v4=9, firms 
surveyed in different fiscal years are basically different. On most firms surveyed, data 
only on 5 data point, including the data at the beginning of the 1st quarter, are available. 
  In what follows I use notations like 200104, which stands for the 4th quarter of 
FY2001, that is, January~March 2002.   
Basically in this research I use two types of variables, “level variables” and 
“difference variables”. Suppose yit stands for the outstanding amount of financial item i 
                                                  
27  In this category, actually all firms with more than ¥600 million in paid-in capital are 
surveyed.  28
at time t, short-term borrowings from financial institutions, for instance, and wt the 
total assets. The first type of variables, level variables, lit, is yit-1/wt-1(*100), and the 
second one, dit, is (yit-1 – yit)/wt-1(*100).  
Note that I use the ratios of financial items, typically “level variables”, lit, like 
the ratio of short-term borrowings to total assets (“short-term bank dependence ratio”), 
at the beginning of the quarter, and in this case the ratio at 200104 stands for the one at 
the end of the 3rd quarter in FY2001, at the end of December 2001, therefore, lit = 
yit-1/wt-1(*100). Also for “difference variables”, dit, the ratio at 200104 stands for the ratio 
of change in during the 4th quarter in FY2001 to the total assets at the beginning of the 
4th quarter in FY2001, therefore, dit = (yit-1 – yit)/wt-1(*100). 
What shown below is the list of variables. 
List of Variables
outstanding amount level variable difference variable
(at the end of the quarter) dependence ratio change in dependence ratio
composition ratio change in composition ratio






















































































































In CEStat, both CEQStat and CEAStat, classifies firms with the size of paid-in 
capital. For readers’ convenience, I show below the average number of persons engaged 
in firms in each size category, first in all industries surveyed and then in manufacturing 
industry. Here I show the picture for the 3rd quarter in FY2004. Reader should note that, 
although it might be so serious for the main body of the research where I use firm-level 
data since FY1994, during the period since the 1960s over which I show an overview of 
long-run trends the correspondence between firm-size in paid-in capital and the one in 
the number of persons engaged has changed dramatically. 
Here I follow the notations for firm size classification in CEQStat. 10~19 
stands for ¥10 million~¥20 million. 
   29
All Industries （unit: \million, number of persons)
total 10~19 20~49 50~99 100~999 1,000~
Number of Firms (N) 1,183,393 886,946 211,109 51,087 28,490 5,761
Number of Managers (M) 3,043,159 2,068,178 635,107 168,385 117,733 53,756
Number of Employees （L) 33,071,882 10,768,648 6,510,881 3,782,220 5,255,074 6,755,059
M+L 36,115,041 12,836,826 7,145,988 3,950,605 5,372,807 6,808,815
M/N 3 2 3 3 4 9
L/N 28 12 31 74 184 1,173
(M+L)/N 31 14 34 77 189 1,182  
 
Manufacturing Industry （unit: \million, number of persons)
total 10~19 20~49 50~99 100~999 1,000~
Number of Firms (N) 211,326 154,922 35,996 11,129 6,987 2,292
Number of Managers (M) 608,684 402,211 112,776 39,295 30,965 23,437
Number of Employees （L) 9,259,530 2,281,233 1,495,042 1,087,582 1,364,876 3,030,797
M+L 9,868,214 2,683,444 1,607,818 1,126,877 1,395,841 3,054,234
M/N 3 3 3 4 4 10
L/N 44 15 42 98 195 1,322
(M+L)/N 47 17 45 101 200 1,333  
  In what follows, together with the results on “all industries”, for comparison 
frequently I refer also to the results on the “manufacturing industry”. 
  Also, I show the results by size of firms. The composition of firms by 
size and by industry is shown below. Their composition ratios do not change by time 
drastically, but they are not rigidly fixed, either.   
I show the picture of the 3rd quarter in FY2004, together with the one of the 1st 
quarter in FY1994 (the beginning quarter under study) and the one of the 2nd quarter of 
FY2009.   
 
  Sample Numbers Surveyed: by Firm Size, All Industries and Manufacturing Industry 
200403 199401 200902
A B B/A (%) A B B/A (%) A B B/A (%)
v4=5 1,882 537 28.5 2,374 695 29.3 1,786 462 25.9
v4=6 2,546 673 26.4 3,000 837 27.9 2,522 644 25.5
v4=7 2,148 785 36.5 1,715 754 44.0 2,076 763 36.8
V4=8 8,129 2,361 29.0 8,853 2,741 31.0 7,633 2,181 28.6
v4=9 5,333 2,185 41.0 4,679 2,033 43.4 4,966 2,004 40.4
Total 20,038 6,541 32.6 20,621 7,060 34.2 18,983 6,054 31.9
A：All Industries B：Manufacturing Industry    30
[I&S-4]. Simple Overview of DP1 
 
  In [I&S-4]~[I&S-7], respectively, I show a simple overview of 4 discussion papers that 
in total comprise the report of the research. 
  DP1 begins with pointing out that the conventional wisdom about the 
overwhelmingly important position and role of financial institutions, large banks in 
particular, in the Japanese financial market, that has been accepted as an obvious 
assumption for research and policy debates on financial phenomena, is a misconception 
and misunderstanding, a myth substantially deviating from the reality. DP2, as part of 
the results, concludes that there is no noteworthy phenomenon that should be judged as 
a clear sign of “credit Crunch” in Japan during 1997-1999. With those exceptions, this 
research is not for drawing conclusions on explicit problem setting. 
  CEStat, particularly CEQStat, provides extraordinary excellent statistical 
information about financing behavior of Japanese firms, small businesses in particular. 
In light of the situation of the conventional wisdom in research and policy debates on 
the Japanese financial market, it is too obvious that more focus should be placed on 
financing behavior of firms rather than on fund supplying behavior of financial 
institutions. However, this informative CEStat has rarely been used in research and 
policy debates on the Japanese financial market. As proactive and effective use of 
CEStat, including its firm-level data, is a way out of this confusion and unfortunate 
situation based on the misconception. This research is a critical review of the 
conventional wisdom and a trial for full-fledged organization of basic information about 
the financing behavior of Japanese firms, small businesses in particular. 
  As a consequence, particularly concerning DP2~DP4, I place more emphasis on 
Introduction and less on Summary.       
 
Key content of DP1 
  The conventional wisdom about the overwhelmingly important position and 
role of the financial institutions in the financial market has been accepted as a basic 
assumption in research and policy debates over financial issues in Japan. DP1, entitled 
“The Low ‘Bank-Dependence Ratio’ and the Further Increase in the ‘Independence of 
Firms from Banks’”, undertakes a radical review of this conventional view and poses it a 
fundamental question. This basic assumption has been a misconception and a myth 
substantially deviating from the reality. This myth has been accepted as a basic 
assumption for several decades. I focus on this issue in DP1, because it is the most basic 
among the issues I investigate in this research, which also serves as a foundation of  31
discussion in DP2~DP4. 
 
Number of zero-short-term-borrowing firms and its ratio to the total 
  Emphasizing the relationship with the “banks’ reluctance to lend”, first of all I 
focus here on firm’s short-term borrowing from financial institutions. (DP1 also 
investigates firm’s long-term borrowing and total borrowing, that is, the sum of 
short-term and long term borrowing.) 
  Here I show the figure for the smallest firm’s group (v4=5) and the list of group 
averages (from [I-2-3]).   
Number of firms with zero-short-term-bank-borrowing,
non-zero-short-term-bank borrowing, and total number:


































The figure shows the number of non-zero-short-term-borrowing firms (red) and 
zero-borrowing firms at the beginning of each quarter (yellow), zero-borrowing firms at 
the end (green), zero-borrowing firms both at the beginning and the end (purple), and 
all the firms surveyed (blue). For readers’ convenience I insert a vertical line on 200104, 
at the mid-period. 
(1)  Three numbers of zero-borrowing firms, at the beginning, at the end, and at both 
points of time, are always almost the same. It implies that most firms with 
zero-borrowing at the beginning end the quarter with zero-borrowing.   
(2)  The ratio of non-zero-short-term-borrowing firms has consistently fallen during 
the study period, to the level of the half around FY1998, and to the 1/3 in FY2009. 
Next is the list of group average of ratios, first for all firms and then for each size 
category. 0-0/T is the ratio of firms with zero-borrowing both at the beginning and end of 
the quarter to all the firms surveyed. I divide the survey period into two parts, until 
FY2001 and FY2002 and after, and show the average of ratios, as Average 1 and 
Average 2, respectively. Average T is for the whole period, and Av.1 – Av.2 is for their 
difference, that is, Average 1 – Average 2. It is the smallest firms’ group (v4=5) where  32
those ratios are the highest (47.3, 61.5, 54.2) and the difference (Av.1 - Av.2) is the 
largest (-14.2).   
Ratios of the number of firms with 0 short-term-bank borrowing both at the beginning and end of the quarter, 
and of firms with zero-change in short-term-bank borrowing during the quarter: averages by period and their difference
All industries, by firm size,  (unit=%)
All firm sizes v4=5 v4=6
nochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochange nochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochange nochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochange
Average 1 41.4 30.7 74.1 62.2 47.3 75.9 48.7 36.2 74.2
Average 2 53.1 42.4 79.8 75.0 61.5 82.0 60.4 47.7 78.9
Average T 47.1 36.4 76.8 68.4 54.2 78.9 54.4 41.8 76.5
Av.1 - Av.2 -11.7 -11.8 -5.8 -12.8 -14.2 -6.1 -11.7 -11.5 -4.7
v4=7 v4=8 v4=9
nochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochange nochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochange nochange/T 0-0/T 0-0/nochange
Average 1 43.9 32.8 74.8 39.9 29.8 74.7 30.7 21.7 70.8
Average 2 56.1 44.7 79.7 52.2 42.7 81.7 42.3 32.0 75.7
Average T 49.8 38.6 77.2 45.9 36.1 78.1 36.3 26.7 73.2
Av.1 - Av.2 -12.2 -11.9 -4.9 -12.4 -12.9 -7.0 -11.6 -10.3 -5.0  
 
Short-term bank dependence ratio 
  From the cumulative distribution of firm’s “short-term bank dependence ratio”, 
the ratio of short-term-borrowing to total assets at the beginning of each quarter, I 
show the transition of p10, p25, p50, p75, p90 (p stands for percentile) in the following 
3 figures, for all firms, for firms in v4=5, and v4=8. 





















































































































Next table shows the period averages of those percentile values, first for all firms and 
then for each size category. In every size category, the short-term bank dependence 
ratios of non-zero-short-term-borrowing firms fell during the study period.    34
Distribution of short-term-bank-borrowing ratio (l
1
t): unit=% all industries, by size
p 1 0p 2 5p 5 0p 7 5p 9 0
all firm szies Average 1 0.00 0.00 6.79 21.67 39.25
Average 2 0.00 0.00 2.03 14.57 29.76
Average T 0.00 0.00 4.49 18.23 34.66
A v . 1   -   A v . 20 . 0 00 . 0 04 . 7 67 . 1 19 . 4 9
v4=5 Average 1 0.00 0.00 1.56 18.09 42.31
Average 2 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.82 28.96
Average T 0.00 0.00 0.80 13.60 35.85
A v . 1   -   A v . 20 . 0 00 . 0 01 . 5 69 . 2 6 1 3 . 3 6
v4=6 Average 1 0.00 0.00 5.29 20.50 39.87
Average 2 0.00 0.00 0.72 14.32 31.34
Average T 0.00 0.00 3.08 17.51 35.74
A v . 1   -   A v . 20 . 0 00 . 0 04 . 5 76 . 1 88 . 5 2
v4=7 Average 1 0.00 0.00 6.17 20.97 38.70
Average 2 0.00 0.00 1.56 15.03 31.27
Average T 0.00 0.00 3.94 18.10 35.10
A v . 1   -   A v . 20 . 0 00 . 0 04 . 6 15 . 9 47 . 4 3
v4=8 Average 1 0.00 0.00 8.19 23.92 41.35
Average 2 0.00 0.00 2.20 15.94 31.65
Average T 0.00 0.00 5.29 20.06 36.66
A v . 1   -   A v . 20 . 0 00 . 0 05 . 9 97 . 9 89 . 7 0
v4=9 Average 1 0.00 0.29 7.56 20.13 34.81
Average 2 0.00 0.00 3.84 14.09 26.10
Average T 0.00 0.15 5.76 17.21 30.59
A v . 1   -   A v . 20 . 0 00 . 2 93 . 7 16 . 0 58 . 7 1  
 
Total bank dependence ratio 
  Concerning “total borrowing” (= short-term borrowing + long-term borrowing), 
I show the figure on the transition of bank dependence ratio for the smallest firms 
(v4=5) and the summary table corresponding to the one shown above (from [I-2-5]). 
What shown above is not peculiar to short-term bank dependence ratios, that is, to 
short-term borrowing.  35






































Distribution of total-bank-borrowing ratio (l
7
t): unit=% all industries, by size
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
All firm sizes Average 1 0.00 2.88 25.81 51.06 73.03
Average 2 0.00 0.00 14.64 40.47 63.04
Average T 0.00 1.49 20.41 45.94 68.20
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 2.88 11.17 10.59 9.98
v4=5 Average 1 0.00 2.69 28.79 56.60 78.79
Average 2 0.00 0.00 21.00 54.01 78.31
Average T 0.00 1.39 25.02 55.35 78.56
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 2.69 7.78 2.59 0.48
v4=6 Average 1 0.00 7.87 32.56 56.52 75.91
Average 2 0.00 0.35 26.19 52.97 73.55
Average T 0.00 4.23 29.48 54.80 74.77
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 7.52 6.37 3.54 2.37
v4=7 Average 1 0.00 5.28 32.26 56.10 76.42
Average 2 0.00 0.00 23.52 51.04 71.06
Average T 0.00 2.73 28.03 53.65 73.82
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 5.28 8.74 5.06 5.36
v4=8 Average 1 0.00 1.85 26.19 51.63 73.47
Average 2 0.00 0.00 11.72 38.12 59.36
Average T 0.00 0.95 19.19 45.10 66.64
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 1.85 14.47 13.51 14.12
v4=9 Average 1 0.00 2.68 19.51 41.87 65.12
Average 2 0.00 0.00 11.03 30.19 48.55
Average T 0.00 1.39 15.40 36.22 57.10
Av.1 - Av.2 0.00 2.68 8.48 11.68 16.56  
 
Everywhere, in smaller firms’ categories in particular, there are rather a small group 
of firms with extreme high total bank dependence ratio. For instance, the p90 value 
for v4=5 remains at the level of almost 80%, which however says that only 10% of 
firms in this category borrow more than 80% of their funds. In the second half-period, 
the p25 value is 0 almost everywhere, and in the categories of v4=7~v4=9 Av.1 – Av.2  36
remarkably fell everywhere. 
 
Net short-term bank dependence ratio 
  Bank borrowing, including short-term bank borrowing, is a part of firm-bank 
trade relationship. In this light DP1 ([I-5]~[I-6]) focuses on deposit (and cash). During 
the study period, although “Bank Dependence Ratios” remarkably fell, the ratio of 
deposit to total assets remained at the same level, or rather moved upwards ([I-4]).     
Firms hold deposit for various purposes, and in DP1 I focus on deposit from 
various perspectives. If a reader pays particular attention to short-term confusion in 
financial market such as “credit crunch”, “financial panic”, or drastic tightening, he 
will recognize deposit as a buffer for them and be interested in the level and 
movement of the net short-term bank dependence ratio, that is (short-term bank 
borrowing minus deposit)/total assets.   
Here I introduce part of the results on this new short-term bank dependence 
ratio. I show the figure on the transition of net short-term bank dependence ratio for 
the smallest firms (v4=5) and the summary table corresponding to the one shown 
above (from [I-5-2]).   







































The p75 value has consistently stayed at the level of 0%, which means that only 25% of 
firms in this size category hold short-term borrowing larger than their bank deposit. 
The p90 value is at the level of 10% recently. 
  Following summary table shows that what shown above is not peculiar to firms 
i n  v 4 = 5 .  A l s o  b y  n e t  s h o r t - t e r m  b a n k  d e pendence ratio, firms’ “Bank Dependence 
Ratio” has not be so high as the conventional wisdom has argued, and recently their  37
“Independence from Banks” has further increased remarkably.   
Distribution of net-short-term-bank-borrowing ratio (l
8
t): unit=% all industries, by size
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
all firm sizes Average 1 -27.45 -11.49 -0.98 12.34 30.39
Average 2 -34.02 -15.55 -3.05 5.56 21.51
Average T -30.63 -13.45 -1.99 9.06 26.09
Av.1 - Av.2 6.57 4.06 2.07 6.77 8.89
v4=5 Average 1 -43.28 -23.32 -7.93 2.64 25.83
Average 2 -49.31 -27.45 -9.97 -0.40 15.10
Average T -46.20 -25.32 -8.92 1.17 20.63
Av.1 - Av.2 6.02 4.13 2.03 3.04 10.73
v4=6 Average 1 -36.16 -18.74 -5.40 5.74 24.68
Average 2 -43.33 -23.52 -8.14 1.19 17.89
Average T -39.63 -21.05 -6.72 3.54 21.39
Av.1 - Av.2 7.17 4.79 2.73 4.55 6.78
v4=7 Average 1 -29.09 -13.36 -2.54 9.08 27.27
Average 2 -35.81 -17.73 -4.73 3.60 21.02
Average T -32.34 -15.48 -3.60 6.43 24.24
Av.1 - Av.2 6.71 4.37 2.19 5.48 6.25
v4=8 Average 1 -23.39 -8.65 0.00 15.34 33.58
Average 2 -32.82 -14.25 -2.29 6.75 23.86
Average T -27.95 -11.36 -1.11 11.18 28.88
Av.1 - Av.2 9.42 5.60 2.30 8.59 9.73
v4=9 Average 1 -18.98 -7.24 0.72 14.02 29.55
Average 2 -22.21 -9.43 -0.79 8.12 20.89
Average T -20.54 -8.30 -0.01 11.16 25.36
Av.1 - Av.2 3.23 2.18 1.51 5.90 8.66  
 
Long-run trend 
  In [I-7], using summary statistics from CEAStat, I show the long-run trend of 
key financial variables (“level variables”) since FY1960. Here I introduce part of the 
results first on the short-term bank dependence ratio by size and in the manufacturing 
sector ([I-7-2]). Note that size category in CEAStat is slightly different from that in 
CEQStat. The unit is million yen, therefore “<2” stands for “less than ¥2 million in 
paid-in capital”. 
  For instance, for firms in 10<50 that corresponds the CEQStat’s v4=5 and 6, 
the ratio (in blue) started with the level below 20% and until very recently around 15% 
level, which has not been remarkably differen t  f r o m  t h a t  o f  b i g g e r  f i r m s .  A s  t h e  
long-run bank dependence ratio in the 1970s were below 20% everywhere ([I-7-3], now 
shown here), total bank dependence ratio was not so high as the conventional wisdom 
argues. 
  38
Long-run Trend in short-term bank borrowing ratio (l
1
t):







































































































































































Long-run Trend in short-term bank borrowing ratio (l
1
t):


































Next, I show one of the most impressive results, the ratio of receivables to total assets, 
“receivable dependence ratio”. Here the results are on all industries ([I-7-6-1]）. 
  In the 1960s and 1970s this ratios were at the level of 30% everywhere, which 
were higher than the short-term bank dependence ratios. In the 2000s firms in 10<50 is 
slightly above 15%, approximately the half of the 1960s level, which is lower than that 
of larger firms.   
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Long-run Trend in Receivable Dependence Ratio (l
1
t):







































































































































































Long-run Trend in Receivable Dependence Ratio(l
1
t):



































This is the receivable dependence ratio, rather than the payable dependence ratio. In 
the 1960s, the hay day of the “dual structure” theory, large firms with advantageous 
position in the market supplied (relent) to smaller firms as trade credit, the 
conventional wisdom argues. Their receivable dependence ratio, however, was at almost 
the same level as the one of small businesses. It is small businesses rather than large 
firms that decreased this dependence ratio remarkably, through the process of 
“liberalization” and development in financial market.      40
[I&S-5]. Simple Overview of DP2 
 
  In DP2, entitled “The Reality of Short-term Shocks like the ‘Credit Crunch’ of 
1997-1999 and the ‘Financial Crisis’ of 2007, and the Effectiveness of ‘Emergency’ 
Economic Measures – A Follow-up to Miwa [2008]”, as a follow-up to Miwa [2008] I 
investigate the reality of the “Credit Crunch” of 1997-1999 in a wider perspective. Also, 
I study the influence both of various “emergency economic measures” adopted as 
countermeasures and of the ultra-easy credit policy that has lasted after the “Crunch”. I 
also focus on the influence of the recent “financial crisis” of 2007.     
  Miwa [2008] focused on firms with larger than ¥600 million in paid-in capital. 
Because of this circumscription, there remains a strong interest in a question: “Did the 
same conclusion applied also to smaller firms with less than ¥600 million in paid-in 
capital? Was the situation different?” Some seem to be frustrated, arguing: “It was 
credit crunch or banks’ reluctance to lend to small businesses that was serious during 
that period, and it is off target like this study to focus only on large companies.” 
  This research project began with a question: “Did the same conclusion apply 
also to smaller firms with less than ¥600 million in paid-in capital? Was the situation 
different?” As all the firms surveyed are replaced every fiscal year, we cannot conduct 
completely the same investigation in this study as in Miwa [2008]. 
  In this research, I place more focus on small businesses than on large firms. It 
was easy to forecast that the conclusion of Miwa [2008] would apply also to small 
businesses (and it does). Upon the conclusion of DP1 that the conventional wisdom 
about the overwhelmingly important position and role of the financial institutions in 
the Japanese financial market is a myth substantially deviating from the reality, we 
have to change the direction of our focus of study on firm’s financing behavior only from 
borrowing from financial institutions to other balance-sheet items, other financing 
measures in particular, like deposits, receivables, payables, and inventory, and their 
mutual relations. As a consequence, in this research, more focus is placed on financing 
behavior of small businesses, expanding the examination point to other items than bank 
borrowings. 
  The study period of this research is 15 and half years, from FY1994 to the 2nd 
quarter of FY2009. The global financial market has radically changed particularly since 
the second half of the 1990s, and this change is one of the causes of the recent financial 
crisis since 2007, argue many observers. In relation particularly to the upheaval and 
chaos after the “Lehman Shock” of September 2008, we have witnessed an increasing 
worldwide attention to the reality of Japan’s “Lost Two Decades”, including the “Credit  41
Crunch” in 1997-1999, and the details of related government policies and their 
effectiveness. Many Japanese, particularly those who were in and around the 
government, argue that policies worked effectively from which we should draw policy 
lessons positively, and others, mostly those outside Japan, argue that we should learn 
much from the Japanese experience not to follow the path of Japan.   
     As shown in DP1, like in Miwa [2008], during 1997-1999 we find no 
noteworthy observation about firms in any size category that should be regarded as a 
sign of serious “Credit Crunch”. In addition, extending the study period, we explore the 
recent “financial crisis” of 2007, and draw almost the same conclusion. Moreover, we 
study also the influence of ultra-easy credit policy that has lasted after the “Crunch”. 
 
Influence of and countermeasure to the situation that there were so many 
zero-short-term-bank-borrowing firms 
  Particularly in smaller firm groups there were so many zero-short-term-bank- 
borrowing firms, whose ratio further increased during the study period. Most firms with 
zero-short-term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of the quarter remain the same at the 
end. Under such a situation, where the ratio of those firms is more than a half, the basic 
measure of this study, also adopted in Miwa [2008], to focus on the distribution of 
short-term-bank-borrowing “difference variable”, the ratio of change in short-term- 
borrowing during the quarter to total assets at the beginning, might face serious 
troubles. In addition, there must be non-zero-short-term-borrowing firms with 0 change 
simply because of borrowing period longer than a quarter.   
  The first table introduced at the beginning of previous section, the list of group 
averages of ratios…, shows also nonchange/T and 0-0/nonchange. The former is the 
ratio of the number of firms with non-change to all firms, and the latter is the ratio of 
firms with zero-short-term-borrowing both at the beginning and the end to the number 
of non-change firms. In the smallest group firms (in v4=5), for instance, in the second 
half period, the former was 75%, and the latter was 82%. Then, such a dominance of 0-0 
firms might seriously affect the studies with short-term-bank-borrowing “difference 
variable”.  
  If, for example, we draw a conclusion: “There were few small businesses which 
were obliged to reduce and actually reduced borrowings from financial institutions even 
during the ‘Credit Crunch’ period”, we have to prepare ourselves to accept a criticism: 
“It might be a false illusion that come up with a dominance of information about the 
firms that had completed their ‘Independence from Banks’ over that about firms with 
non-zero-bank-borrowing. Cleaning up such a noise, we have to focus on firms that  42
needed to borrow from financial institutions”. 
  As shown in the next figure, ratio of non-zero-short-term-bank borrowing firms 
was lower in smaller firm group. It drastically fell in every group during the study 
period. 
  Nonetheless, by focusing only on firms with more than ¥600 million in paid-in 
capital and limiting the study period to FY1994~FY2000, fortunately, its influence to 
the conclusion of Miwa [2008] seems to be relatively minor.   
Ratio of Non-zero-short-term-bank-borrowing firms: by size






































    Next figure shows the transition of p10, p25, p50, p75, p90 values of the 
distribution of short-term-bank-borrowing “difference variable”. Actually, most probably 
due primarily to the influence in the ratio of non-change firms, the distribution seems to 
be rapidly concentrating around 0 value, like “collapsing” from both sides. This figure is 
about all the firms in all industries.    43
Disribution of changes in short-term bank borrowing ratio (d
1
t):








































































































































































































  I tried two countermeasures: the first is to exclude firms with zero-short-term- 
borrowing at the beginning of the quarter (Modified Sample 1); and the second is to 
exclude firms with non-change in short-term-borrowing (Modified Sample 2). 
Confirming that those two countermeasures draw similar results, mostly in this 
research I take the first one (Modified Sample 1). 
 
“Credit Crunch”?: a follow-up of Miwa [2008] 
  Next figure shows the distribution of short-term-bank-borrowing “difference 
variable” for firms in v4=5, with Modified Sample 1 ([II-3-1]). 
Distribution of changes in short-term bank borrowing ratio (d
1
t):



































What is prominent here is the shift of distribution in the 3rd quarter of FY1998, 
suggesting a drastic increase in small firm’s borrowing, which is most probably a 
consequence of temporary explosion of their borrowing stimulated by “the Special 
Credit Guarantee Policy” for small businesses that began in October 1998 and ended in 
March 2001.   
  Next is the corresponding figure for v4=8. As the “Policy” was for small 
businesses, there is no such a drastic shift in 199803.28  (Hereafter, often I show figures 
for V4=5 and 8, the former for representative of small businesses and the latter for 
larger firms.) 
Disribution of changes in short-term bank borrowing ratio  (d
1
t):




































With the exception of this temporary movement, there is no noteworthy 
observation that suggests an occurrence of serious “credit crunch”. 
 
Distribution of level variables: 
The ratio of receivables, payables, or inventory to total assets 
  From the second half of DP2 to DP4, I expand the examination items from 
transaction items with financial institutions like borrowing and deposit to a wider 
variety of balance-sheet items. The major focus is placed on receivables and payables, 
and also inventory often alleged to be closely connected with them. [II-6] and [II-7] focus 
                                                  
28  Under this policy scheme, it was profitable to borrow in long-term, 5 to 7 years. The 
shift of distribution is more prominent in corresponding figures on long-tem borrowing, 
shown in [II-4-1] and [II-5-2]. The shift is clearly observed in figures both for v4=5 and 6, 
nothing for v4=8 and v4=9, and a slight shift for v4=9, for firms with ¥50~¥100 million 
in paid-in capital.    45
on the level variables, the ratio of receivables, payables, or inventory to total assets, and 
[II-8]~[II-11] on the difference variables, the ratio of change in deposits, receivables, 
payables, or inventory to total variables. 
  The primary purpose of the second half of DP2 is to organize the basic 
information. For illustration, I introduce here, for v4=5 and 8, the distribution of the 
ratio of payable to total asset, that is (might be) close substitute for bank borrowing 
([II-6-2]） 。 








































































In either class the ratio has been widely distributed, and it has been consistently higher 
in v4=5 than in v4=8. What those figures show is far from the schematic unilateral 
relation in the conventional wisdom that small business has obtained credit from large 
firms through payables.   
  Rapid decrease in the payable/(total asset) ratio during the recent “financial  46
crisis”, not during the former “Credit Crunch”, is prominent. The same applies also to 
the receivable/(total asset) ratio ([II-6-1]). The reason and mechanism are unexplored, 
yet. 
  The ratio of inventory to total asset has been consistently much lower than 
either the receivable/(total asset) ratio or the payable/(total asset) ratio. In addition, 
unlike the latter two ratios, during the recent “financial crisis”, the inventory/(total 
asset) ratio has not decreased ([II-7]). The conventional wisdom that trade credit has 
been used for inventory finance will be under pressure for reevaluation. 
  What shown above holds with little modification when I limit the examination 
to the manufacturing industry.     
 
Distribution of difference variables 
In [II-8]~[II-11], I examine the distribution of difference variables, the ratio of 
change in deposits, receivables, payables, or inventory to total assets, respectively. 
For illustration, I introduce here, for v4=5 and 8, the distribution of the ratio of 
change in payable to total asset ([II-10-1]).   
Distribution of changes in payable ratio (d
5
t):



































Distribution of changes in payable ratio (d
5
t):



































In either class the ratio has been widely distributed. Nowhere I find a prominent 
movement of the distribution of change in payable dependence ratio, for instance, in 
that of small businesses during the “Credit Crunch” or at the 3rd quarter of FY1998.   
  The distribution of change in inventory dependence ratio, the ratio of change in 
inventory to outstanding total asset, shows that its movement is by far smaller than 
that of receivables or payables. The close relationship between inventory and trade 
credit, that is, receivables and payables, that the conventional wisdom takes it obvious 
and for granted, is unclear (for the details see DP4). The conventional wisdom that 
trade credit has been used for inventory finance will be under pressure for reevaluation. 
  The conclusion of Miwa [2008], focusing on the movement of the ratio of change 
in short-term bank borrowing to total asset, that we find no clear sign of serious “credit 
crunch” applies also to the situations where we focus on other financial variables like 
receivables, payables, and inventory and expand our examination to small businesses.     
  Dramatic decrease in the difference variable in payables, particularly for v4=8, 
in the 3rd quarter of FY2008, immediately after the Lehman Shock is prominent. 
  What shown above holds with little modification when I limit the examination 
to the manufacturing industry.    48
[I&S-6]. Simple Overview of DP3 
 
  Based on the results of DP1 and DP2, DP3, entitled “The Reality of Trade 
Credit and its Link to Bank Borrowing and Inventory: (1) Overall Discussion and 
Preliminary Investigation”, together with DP4, focuses on “trade credit” like receivable 
and payable. In DP3 and DP4, as the first step to investigate the reality of firm’s 
behavior on financing and asset choice I see balance-sheet items other than “capital” 
and borrowing from financial institutions, of which DP3 is the first half. 
  For several decades the conventional wisdom about the overwhelmingly 
important position and role of financial institutions, big banks in particular, and the 
decisive significance of borrowing from financial institutions as firm’s financing 
measure has been dominant. Reflecting such a situation, interest on other financing 
measures including trade credit has been extremely weak. Consequently, the 
conventional wisdom primarily based on sketchy report or story of “expert’s” personal 
experience, neither with quantitative data nor rough size estimates, has become the 
dominant view. In view of such a situation, as a basic work for investigating the reality 
of firm’s behavior in choosing financing related variables including borrowing from 
financial institutions, DP3 and DP4 organize relevant basic information, focusing on 
receivable, payable and inventory.   
  DP3 first organizes information about the reality of trade credit and its 
long-run trends ([III-2]), and next discusses generally the interrelationship among trade 
credit, borrowing from financial institutions, and inventory ([III-3]). In [III-4]~[III-7], as 
the first step of investigating the relationships among relevant variables I compare the 
two groups of firms, firms with non-zero-short-term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of 
the quarter (type A) and firms with zero-borrowing (type B). It is based on the 
expectation that there is an essential difference between two types of firms, which is 
revealed in firm’s choice, so that through comparison we will obtain useful information 
and hints for future research on the decision mechanism on short-term bank borrowing 
and the causality in making decisions concerning financial variables. 
  In DP4, by studying correlation coefficients among financial variables and 
through multiple regressions I examine the relationships among those choice variables. 
The first half, [IV-2]~[IV-3], is for studying correlation coefficients, upon which the 
second half, [IV-4]~[IV-5], is for multiple regressions.     
   
The reality of trade credit and its long-run trends 
  The conventional wisdom about the overwhelmingly important position and  49
role of financial institutions of the traditional types, big banks in particular, in the 
financial markets, which I call “bank-centralism”, has been dominant not only in Japan 
but also in the world. As a result, almost everywhere trade credit has never been much 
emphasized, and most people, including researchers and persons in charge of policies, 
have lacked interest in its role and function. Particularly in Japan, under the schematic 
interpretation or preoccupation based on the “dual structure” theory, interest on the 
reality of trade credit and related transaction has remained on the shelf.   
[III-2], entitled “The Reality of Trade Credit and its Lon-run Trends”, using 
summary statistics from CEAStat, examines the schematic interpretation based on the 
“dual structure” theory, comparing with the reality of long-run trends in trade credit. 
Comparing with the figures on long-run trends in receivable dependence ratio shown in 
[I-7], discussion proceeds with long-run trends in payable- and inventory dependence 
ratio. 
For the details I ask readers to refer to DP3. Here I introduce two impressive 
figures on long-run trends in payable dependence ratio, and then corresponding two 
figures on inventory dependence ratio, all for all industries.   
I start with figures on payable dependence  ratio  ([III-2-2-]).      
Long-run Trend in Payable Dependent Ratio(l
1
t):







































































































































































Long-run Trend in Payable Dependence Ratio(l
1
t):


































Then, two figures on inventory dependence ratios ([III-2-3]). 
Long-run Trend in Inventory Dependent Ratio(l
1
t):








































































































































































Long-run Trand in Payable Dependence Ratio(l1t):


































Readers who accept the conventional wisdom that trade credit has been used for 
inventory finance should compare the trends in both the levels and changes in 
receivable- and payable dependence ratio.     
 
Choice between trade credit (trade partners) and bank borrowing (banks) 
  [III-3], entitled “Choice between trade credit (trade partners) and bank 
borrowing (banks): Introductory discussion”, is just an introductory discussion. It does 
not fit in so easily with summary.   
  Here I simply introduce one concise fact. Particularly during the heyday of the 
“dual structure” theory, a large portion of bills receivable (part of receivables) were 
discounted by banks. The ratio of outstanding amount of discounted bills receivable to 
total assets used to be fairly high in every firm size class. For banks, it was one of the 
major forms of lending to firms. What is important here are that the lending rate in this 
form was almost at the equivalent level with the one in other major lending form like 
certificate lending, and that in every firm size class many firms did not discount at 
banks a dominant portion of their bills receivable, suggesting that the choice was not a 
corner  solution.     
   
Comparison of firms with non-zero-short-term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of the 
quarter (type A) and firms with zero-short-term-bank-borrowing (type B):   
Distribution of individual item’s composition ratio 
  In [III-4]~[III-7], as the first step of investigating the relationships among 
relevant variables, I compare the two groups of firms, firms with 
non-zero-short-term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of the quarter (type A) and firms  52
with zero-short-term-bank-borrowing (type B). It is based on the expectation that there 
is an essential difference between two types of firms, which is revealed in firm’s choice, 
so that through comparison we will obtain useful information and hints for future 
research on the decision mechanism on short-term bank borrowing and the causality in 
making decisions concerning financial variables. It is to seek a clue to think: “Is it 
because they could not obtain loans from banks? Or they did not?” “On what factors 
their decision depends?”   
  [III-4] and [III-5] focus on the individual item’s composition ratio (level 
variables), and [III-6] and [III-7] on the difference variables. 
  For illustration, here I introduce two figures on the distribution of payable 
dependence ratio, for all firms surveyed in all industries, and their comparison table 
([III-4-4]). 
Distribution of Payable Dependence Ratio (l
5
t):
















Distribution of Payable Dependence Ratio (l5t):
















Distribution of payable dependence ratio (l
5
t): Comparison of firms in Type A and Type B, unit=%
all industries, all size firms
mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Firms with non-zero-short- Average 1 17.53 0.21 4.38 13.86 25.48 39.64
term-bank-borrowing Average 2 15.49 0.10 3.48 11.54 22.49 35.83
at the beginning of the quarter Average T 16.54 0.15 3.94 12.74 24.03 37.80
(A) Av.1 - Av.2 2.04 0.11 0.89 2.32 2.98 3.81
Firms with zero-short-term- Average 1 15.46 0.00 0.00 6.34 22.30 44.84
bank-borrowing Average 2 15.30 0.00 0.07 6.95 21.83 42.57
at the beginning of the quarter Average T 15.39 0.00 0.03 6.64 22.07 43.75
(B) Av.1 - Av.2 0.16 0.00 -0.07 -0.61 0.47 2.27
A v e r a g e   1 2 . 0 70 . 2 14 . 3 87 . 5 23 . 1 8 - 5 . 2 0
(A) - (B) Average 2 0.18 0.10 3.41 4.59 0.66 -6.74
A v e r a g e   T 1 . 1 50 . 1 53 . 9 16 . 1 01 . 9 6 - 5 . 9 5
Av.1 - Av.2 1.88 0.11 0.96 2.93 2.52 1.54  
 
Next, I list “particularly prominent observations” in [III-4] for all industries ([III-4-1]). 
(1) Both in all industries and in manufacturing industry, there is a remarkable 
difference between two groups of firms in the level of the ratio of deposit to total asset, 
particularly in p50, p75, p90, and mean. This pattern has consistently continued over 
the study period. However, for instance the p50 value of type B falls far short of the p75 
value of type A, which shows that all the type B firms hold higher ratio (to total asset) of 
deposit than all the type A firms. 
(2) There is a prominent difference between two types of firms in long-term bank 
dependence ratio. In addition, concerning the type B firms there is a noteworthy 
difference between the first half and the second half of the period. (We executed 
comparison by firm size of the distribution of long-term bank dependence ratio in [I-2-4] 
for all industries, and in [I-3-2] for manufacturing industry.) Particularly for the type B 
large firms, the long-term bank dependence ratio decreased dramatically in the second 
half period. 
(3) Rather we had better pay the prime attention to the observation that there is no 
difference between two types of firms, concerning receivable, payable, and inventory. In 
addition, there is no difference in that distribution pattern remains stable throughout 
most of the study period and that during the period of recent “financial crisis” both ratio 
of receivable and payable (but not inventory) decreased dramatically.   
   
Comparison of firms with non-zero-short-term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of the 
quarter (type A) and firms with zero-short-term-bank-borrowing (type B):   
Distribution of change in individual item’s composition ratio 
  [III-6] and [III-7] examine the distribution of change in individual item’s 
composition ratio, comparing two groups of firms, firms with non-zero-short- 
term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of the quarter (type A) and firms with  54
zero-short-term-bank-borrowing (type B). Basically, examination methods are the same 
as the ones adopted in [III-4] and [III-5]. 
   For illustration, here as well I introduce two figures on the distribution of 
change in payable dependence ratio, for all firms surveyed in all industries, and their 
comparison table ([III-6-4]). 
Distribution of Change in Payable Dependence Ratio (d
5
t):















Distribution of Change in Payable Dependence Ratio (d
5
t):

















Distribution of change in payable dependence ratio (d
5
t): Comparison of firms in Type A and Type B, unit=%
all industries, all size firms
p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
Firms with non-zero-short- Average 1 -5.00 -1.48 -0.01 1.56 4.86
term-bank-borrowing Average 2 -4.30 -1.25 -0.02 1.40 4.47
at the beginning of the quarter Average T -4.66 -1.37 -0.01 1.48 4.67
(A) Av.1 - Av.2 -0.70 -0.22 0.02 0.16 0.39
Firms with zero-short-term- Average 1 -5.46 -0.82 0.00 0.92 5.31
bank-borrowing Average 2 -5.06 -0.87 0.00 1.04 5.20
at the beginning of the quarter Average T -5.27 -0.84 0.00 0.98 5.26
(B) Av.1 - Av.2 -0.40 0.05 0.00 -0.12 0.11
Average 1 0.46 -0.66 -0.01 0.64 -0.45
(A) - (B) Average 2 0.76 -0.39 -0.02 0.36 -0.73
Average T 0.60 -0.53 -0.01 0.51 -0.58
Av.1 - Av.2 -0.30 -0.27 0.02 0.28 0.28  
Nowhere in [III-6] and [III-7], represented in figures and table introduced 
above, I find prominent difference between two firm groups. For example, no 
prominence difference became obvious during the “Credit Crunch” in 1997-1999 or the 
“financial crisis” of 2007.  56
[I&S-7]. Simple Overview of DP4 
 
  Based on the results of DP1 and DP2, DP4, entitled “The Reality of Trade 
Credit and its Link to Bank Borrowing and Inventory: (2) Correlation Coefficients and 
Multiple Regressions”, together with DP3, focuses on “trade credit” like receivable and 
payable. In DP3 and DP4, as the first step to investigate the reality of firm’s behavior on 
financing and asset choice I see balance-sheet items other than “capital” and borrowing 
from financial institutions, of which DP4 is the second half. 
In DP4, by studying correlation coefficients among financial variables and 
through multiple regressions I examine the relationships among those choice variables. 
The first half, [IV-2]~[IV-3], is for studying correlation coefficients, upon which the 
second half, [IV-4]~[IV-5], is for multiple regressions.   
  Neither correlation coefficients studies nor multiple regressions in DP4 is an 
empirical study of the standard type in the sense that it is not testing hypotheses drawn 
from careful theoretical investigation. The primary aim is to organize basic information 
as a foundation for promoting of theoretical- and empirical investigations, which will 
lead us to appropriate and better understanding of financial and capital markets in 
Japan. Concurrently, by careful examination with reference to detailed firm-level data, 
it helps us to escape from the present state where the conventional wisdom has been 
established as the dominant view that is primarily based on sketchy report or story of 
“expert’s” personal experience, neither with quantitative data nor rough size estimates. 
    Like in the previous discussion, I examine both “level variables” and “difference 
variables”. [IV-2] and [IV-3] examine the correlation coefficients between “level 
variables” and “difference variables”, respectively. 
  At this time, no useful and appropriate information is available for questions 
like “How do firms choose decision variables, upon which ‘composition ratios’ are 
determined?” and “What should we expect to find in relationship and interlocking 
movement among ‘composition ratios’?” In what follows in DP4, I organize information 
focusing on (1) the relation between variable on short-term borrowing from financial 
institutions and other financial variables, and (2) inter-relations among 3 variables, 
receivable, payable, and inventory. As “other variables” for the former, I focus on 5 
variables, long-term borrowing, deposit, receivable, payable, and inventory.           
  In most cases “composition ratios” are “structural” in the sense that, depending 
on such factors as the situation, substance of business, and trade customs of the 
industry the firm belongs, its firm size, and others, those ratios do not change radically 
not only during a quarter but also during the whole study period. Accordingly, I chose  57
the examination objects selectively. This selectivity increases more in [IV-4] for multiple 
regressions, where examination is limited to the manufacturing industry to reduce the 
noises due to industry-specific factors and focused on firms with non-zero-short-term- 
bank-borrowing at the beginning of the quarter. The latter choice is because there are so 
many zero-short-term-borrowing-firms that correlation coefficients between short-term- 
borrowing variable and other variables and multiple regressions on short-term- 
borrowing variables would be seriously distorted. In examining inter-relations among 3 
variables, receivable, payable, and inventory, particularly in multiple regressions, I also 
compare two groups of firms, non-zero-short-term-bank-borrowing firms with zero- 
short-term-bank-borrowing firms. 
  In examining changes in composition ratios, focusing on “difference variables”, 
I assumed that the “structural” factors that determine the composition ratios did not 
change radically in a short period of time, upon which I expected to find stable 
relationship and interlocking movement among changes in ‘composition ratios’ . (This 
expectation was completely violated, however.)   
  The catalogue of correlation coefficients is the same as in “composition ratios” 
study. In addition, I contrive ways also to investigate questions: “Can we observe during 
the period of ‘Credit Crunch’ or ‘financial crisis’ shocks that ‘change’ the relations 
observed in peace-time?”; “Can we observe under the ‘ultra-easy credit policy with 
zero-interest lending rate’ any change in ‘relationships’ observed in other periods?”         
    With 3 reasons, particularly in the part on multiple regressions, I limit the 
number of basic tables, with adding its variations: (1) It needs huge time and energy in 
preparing tables on correlation coefficients and multiple regressions; (2) The marginal 
rate of return on increasing the number of tables decreases rapidly; (3) It is cumbersome 
also for readers to increase further the number of such tables. 
    Both in [IV-2] on composition ratios and in [IV-3] in changes on composition 
ratios, with the only exception between receivable and payable, there is no noteworthy 
“relationship” between any pair of variables. For example, between short-term bank 
borrowing and other variables, there is no noteworthy relationship, with the only 
exception of often observed strong negative “relationship” with long-term bank 
borrowing. This point holds also in the periods of the “Credit Crunch” and the “financial 
crisis” or the period under the “ultra-easy credit policy with zero-interest lending rate”.     
    Taking the above results into consideration, in multiple regressions in [IV-4] 
and [IV-5] I place focus on the inter-relations among 3 variables (receivable, payable, 
and inventory), particularly between receivable and payable. Specifically, I choose as 
the basic point of reference the study of manufacturing firms with non-zero-short-term-  58
bank-borrowing at the beginning of the quarter, to which I add many variations. 
Noticing that relations are stable in cases where “strong” relations are observed, I 
choose to table the results once in 3 years (of the 1st quarter of the fiscal year), 6 time 
points during the study period. At the heart of the study is the multiple regression of 
receivable composition ratio (and change in receivable composition ratio) on payable 
composition ratio (and change in payable composition ratio) and inventory composition 
ratio (and change in inventory composition ratio).   
   
Correlation coefficients among composition ratios 
  For illustration I introduce here the correlation coefficients table on 
non-zero-short-term-bank-borrowing firms in the manufacturing industry, in all size 
categories, which is the most representative among correlation coefficients tables in my 
study ([IV-2-2]). 
  As shown above (detailed in DP1), most firms with zero-short-term-bank- 
borrowing at the beginning end the quarter also with zero-short-term-bank-borrowing. 
Of 8 correlation coefficients listed on the table for every quarter, 5 are between 
short-term-borrowing and other variables.    59
Correlation Coefficients among Composition Ratios (l
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199401 7,060 0.040 -0.097 -0.034 -0.044 0.157 0.547 0.046 0.170
199402 7,003 0.022 -0.091 -0.038 -0.060 0.159 0.511 0.014 0.167
199403 6,835 0.022 -0.103 -0.051 -0.055 0.175 0.540 0.038 0.163
199404 6,833 0.035 -0.101 -0.045 -0.068 0.160 0.515 0.011 0.156
199501 6,936 0.067 -0.095 -0.052 -0.066 0.121 0.509 0.027 0.190
199502 6,981 0.058 -0.092 -0.047 -0.052 0.127 0.490 0.031 0.223
199503 6,916 0.054 -0.098 -0.046 -0.042 0.112 0.510 0.041 0.209
199504 1,814 0.047 -0.071 -0.038 -0.051 0.103 0.498 0.026 0.209
199601 6,553 0.038 -0.089 -0.057 -0.045 0.094 0.528 0.048 0.170
199602 6,532 0.015 -0.087 -0.038 0.012 0.097 0.302 0.035 0.131
199603 6,501 0.001 -0.088 -0.044 -0.031 0.060 0.535 0.039 0.167
199604 6,362 0.025 -0.096 -0.038 -0.041 0.094 0.506 0.015 0.162
199701 6,549 0.006 -0.048 -0.047 -0.046 0.068 0.486 0.040 0.174
199702 6,525 0.000 -0.048 -0.044 -0.044 0.064 0.420 0.031 0.218
199703 6,444 0.012 -0.110 -0.034 -0.040 0.106 0.446 0.042 0.203
199704 6,359 0.004 -0.093 -0.029 -0.049 0.110 0.402 0.019 0.136
199801 6,542 0.025 -0.103 -0.059 -0.033 0.142 0.551 0.050 0.159
199802 6,407 0.023 -0.087 -0.053 -0.049 0.134 0.518 0.059 0.171
199803 6,391 0.020 -0.115 -0.042 -0.044 0.137 0.523 0.070 0.161
199804 6,211 0.015 -0.109 -0.021 -0.045 0.126 0.500 0.038 0.141
199901 6,664 0.040 -0.127 -0.035 -0.027 0.133 0.527 0.053 0.182
199902 6,560 0.063 -0.129 -0.015 -0.023 0.123 0.514 0.046 0.186
199903 6,445 0.058 -0.140 -0.010 -0.027 0.135 0.550 0.060 0.177
199904 6,311 0.042 -0.110 -0.013 -0.032 0.118 0.537 0.042 0.168
200001 6,530 0.016 -0.129 -0.041 -0.060 0.142 0.564 0.057 0.155
200002 6,456 0.046 -0.101 -0.037 -0.005 0.137 0.532 0.054 0.173
200003 6,324 0.045 -0.114 -0.028 -0.027 0.140 0.532 0.073 0.187
200004 6,189 0.041 -0.110 -0.023 -0.014 0.144 0.517 0.041 0.186
200101 6,368 0.037 -0.262 0.098 0.105 0.090 0.571 0.063 0.177
200102 6,360 0.052 -0.122 -0.014 -0.018 0.103 0.534 0.056 0.197
200103 6,264 0.046 -0.139 0.009 0.004 0.112 0.541 0.060 0.172
200104 6,102 0.066 -0.120 -0.002 -0.002 0.113 0.528 0.038 0.167
200201 6,424 0.063 -0.115 -0.047 -0.053 0.101 0.580 0.057 0.146
200202 6,417 0.060 -0.131 -0.034 -0.051 0.118 0.549 0.051 0.156
200203 6,293 0.086 -0.121 -0.045 -0.046 0.089 0.577 0.061 0.139
200204 6,118 0.056 -0.114 -0.041 -0.010 0.087 0.572 0.039 0.137
200301 6,399 0.036 -0.073 -0.031 0.326 0.068 0.491 0.073 0.132
200302 6,334 0.057 -0.095 -0.019 0.208 0.083 0.462 0.067 0.137
200303 6,305 0.050 -0.073 -0.023 0.360 0.064 0.495 0.070 0.137
200304 6,219 0.129 -0.119 -0.038 -0.004 0.127 0.536 0.034 0.148
200401 6,672 0.024 -0.094 -0.034 -0.019 0.119 0.575 0.070 0.163
200402 6,579 0.021 -0.114 -0.048 -0.016 0.106 0.552 0.074 0.184
200403 6,541 0.017 -0.105 -0.046 -0.043 0.119 0.569 0.088 0.177
200404 6,489 0.018 -0.100 -0.046 -0.040 0.115 0.548 0.050 0.172
200501 6,616 0.093 -0.107 -0.050 -0.042 0.116 0.312 0.090 0.108
200502 6,588 0.078 -0.114 -0.045 -0.035 0.110 0.204 0.084 0.073
200503 6,499 0.081 -0.092 -0.053 -0.033 0.110 0.276 0.079 0.085
200504 6,376 0.106 -0.095 -0.045 -0.060 0.109 0.541 0.066 0.188
200601 6,509 0.118 -0.091 -0.077 -0.004 0.117 0.538 0.093 0.164
200602 6,516 0.104 -0.102 -0.061 -0.062 0.115 0.578 0.083 0.202
200603 6,404 0.139 -0.094 -0.056 -0.060 0.108 0.578 0.064 0.174
200604 6,349 0.119 -0.080 -0.056 -0.062 0.102 0.562 0.054 0.177
200701 6,389 0.083 -0.086 -0.060 0.012 0.113 0.556 0.106 0.185
200702 6,379 0.090 -0.097 -0.045 0.021 0.102 0.544 0.111 0.207
200703 6,356 0.088 -0.093 -0.045 0.014 0.103 0.536 0.098 0.177
200704 6,197 0.092 -0.089 -0.023 0.016 0.111 0.521 0.073 0.169
200801 6,440 0.051 -0.045 -0.029 -0.034 0.099 0.532 0.063 0.134
200802 6,362 0.051 -0.050 -0.025 -0.027 0.101 0.548 0.062 0.165
200803 6,304 0.038 -0.087 -0.031 -0.013 0.093 0.566 0.051 0.168
200804 6,184 0.040 -0.098 -0.027 -0.037 0.098 0.547 0.055 0.166
200901 6,087 0.077 -0.094 -0.027 -0.033 0.128 0.555 0.066 0.179
200902 6,054 0.104 -0.116 -0.024 -0.040 0.126 0.590 0.059 0.181
Average 1 6,385 0.034 -0.107 -0.030 -0.032 0.120 0.509 0.043 0.175
Average 2 6,380 0.072 -0.096 -0.041 0.004 0.105 0.520 0.070 0.158
Average T 6,383 0.052 -0.102 -0.036 -0.014 0.113 0.514 0.056 0.167
Av.1 - Av.2 5 -0.039 -0.011 0.011 -0.036 0.015 -0.011 -0.027 0.017   60
  Here I use “level variables”, l1t~l6t for short-term borrowing, long-term 
borrowing, deposit, receivable, payable, and inventory, respectively. For example l1t vs. 
l5t stands for the correlation coefficient between short-term borrowing dependence ratio 
and payable dependence ratio.   
  N stands for the number of samples surveyed, and the number on the first 
column shows the quarter surveyed. As mentioned above, 199401 stands for the 1st 
quarter of FY1994. 5 columns from the 3rd to 7th are for correlation coefficient between 
short-term bank borrowing variable (l1t) and other variables, and the last 3 for 3 
variables (receivable l4t, payable l5t, and inventory l6t).    
  For reader’s convenience, I box correlation coefficient when its absolute value 
exceeds 0.4, suggesting an extremely strong relationship.   
    The 4 rows at the bottom of the table show, as before, the averages and its 
difference. Average 1, Average 2, Average T, respectively, stands for the average of 
correlation coefficient in the first half period (from FY1994 to FY2001), in the second 
half period (from FY2002 to the 2nd quarter of FY2009), and the whole study period, and 
the last row is for the difference between Average 1 and Average 2. 
  Those explanations apply also to [IV-3] on changes in composition ratios, with 
the exception of variables where I use di instead of li.  
  Three points are obvious. (1) The correlation coefficient between l4 and l5 
(receivable and payable) on the 3rd column from the right almost always exceeds 0.4, 
implying that there is stably an extremely strong relationship between them. (2) In 
other pair of variables, we find no correlation coefficient whose absolute value exceeds 
0.4, and almost everywhere its absolute value by far lower than 0.4. (3) We find no 
noteworthy change in the levels and signs of correlation coefficients either between the 
“Credit Crunch” in 1997-1999 or the “financial crisis” of 2007 and remaining study 
period or between the first half period and the second half under the “ultra-easy credit 
policy with zero-interest-lending-rate”.   
  Concerning the correlation coefficients between l4 and l5 (receivable and 
payable), (1) correlation coefficients for all the industries are higher than the ones for 
the manufacturing industry, (2) correlation coefficients for firms with non-zero-short- 
term-bank borrowing at the beginning of the quarter are higher than the ones for all 
firms, and (3) correlation coefficients are higher for large (or medium-sized) firms than 
the ones for smaller firms.   
   
Correlation coefficients among changes in composition ratios 
   Also concerning correlation coefficients among changes in composition ratios,  61
for illustration, I introduce here the correlation coefficients table on 
non-zero-short-term-bank-borrowing firms in the manufacturing industry, in all size 
categories, which is the most representative among correlation coefficients tables in my 
study ([IV-3-2]). 
  Here I use “difference variables”, d1t~d6t, for change in short-term borrowing, 
long-term borrowing, deposit, receivable, payable, and inventory, respectively. For 
example d1t vs. d5t stands for the correlation coefficient between changes in short-term 
borrowing dependence ratio and change in payable dependence ratio. 
 
  The basic result of the study on correlation coefficients among “difference 
variables” is almost the same with that on correlation coefficients among “level 
variables”. For example, the average of correlation coefficients over the whole study 
period (Average T) of “difference variables” on receivable and payable is 0.513, and the 
one for “level variables” is 0.514. 
  Two points might gather attention. First, outside the pair of receivable and 
payable (d4t vs. d5t), there sometimes, but not quite often (8 on the table), appear 
correlation coefficients whose absolute value exceed 0.4. Second, we observe a 
consistently stable negative29 strong relation between short-term bank borrowing and 
long-term bank borrowing (d1t vs. d2t). Its Average T is -0.237, and the absolute value of 
its correlation coefficient exceed 0.4 in 4 quarters which interestingly are all during the 
“Credit Crunch” of 1997-1999. In this research, however, I have not asked why. 
                                                  
29  Note that it is “negative” correlation rather than “positive” one.  62
Correlation Coefficients among Changes in Composition Ratios (d
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199401 5399 -0.381 0.179 0.069 0.019 0.071 0.497 -0.066 0.185
199402 5277 -0.276 0.124 0.145 0.028 0.111 0.561 -0.025 0.414
199403 5190 -0.249 0.144 0.460 0.389 0.095 0.687 -0.138 0.118
199404 5207 -0.276 0.126 0.200 0.098 0.135 0.638 -0.085 0.258
199501 5363 -0.276 0.162 0.228 0.033 0.120 0.560 -0.098 0.219
199502 5337 -0.334 0.123 0.143 -0.046 0.083 0.551 -0.101 0.159
199503 5314 -0.298 0.120 0.135 0.004 0.091 0.435 -0.166 0.182
199504 5236 -0.384 0.152 0.105 -0.027 0.036 0.513 -0.291 0.047
199601 5008 -0.312 0.147 0.152 0.020 0.074 0.545 -0.152 0.198
199602 4972 -0.082 0.113 0.136 -0.025 0.080 0.615 -0.037 0.199
199603 4963 -0.233 0.207 0.154 -0.021 0.092 0.529 -0.157 0.121
199604 4877 -0.230 0.191 0.147 -0.026 0.059 0.581 -0.251 0.062
199701 4948 -0.343 0.115 0.169 0.056 0.129 0.533 -0.116 0.214
199702 4873 -0.974 -0.160 0.039 -0.005 0.021 0.432 -0.083 0.265
199703 4847 -0.292 0.066 0.194 0.004 0.110 0.477 -0.120 0.112
199704 4795 -0.491 0.124 0.103 -0.005 0.054 0.552 -0.288 0.023
199801 4869 -0.206 0.202 0.142 -0.014 0.057 0.532 -0.124 0.235
199802 4756 -0.449 0.122 0.177 -0.026 0.191 0.470 -0.074 0.179
199803 4771 -0.365 0.146 -0.038 -0.031 0.134 0.607 -0.066 0.206
199804 4647 -0.438 0.144 0.119 0.023 0.049 0.789 -0.264 -0.045
199901 4881 -0.165 0.103 0.195 0.048 0.224 0.548 -0.050 0.198
199902 4768 -0.363 0.081 0.167 0.033 0.257 0.503 -0.080 0.217
199903 4726 0.234 0.153 0.336 -0.003 0.086 0.506 -0.058 0.149
199904 4623 -0.135 0.189 0.089 0.005 0.085 0.491 -0.287 0.025
200001 4761 -0.335 0.200 0.172 0.015 0.123 0.491 -0.099 0.193
200002 4588 0.199 0.167 0.134 0.099 0.063 0.527 -0.050 0.203
200003 4566 -0.241 0.174 0.079 -0.044 0.153 0.396 -0.083 0.319
200004 4451 -0.213 0.126 0.089 -0.037 0.062 0.399 -0.342 0.005
200101 4561 -0.229 0.268 -0.145 0.049 0.129 -0.035 -0.075 0.173
200102 4485 -0.287 0.219 0.230 0.071 0.089 0.538 -0.063 0.233
200103 4435 -0.162 0.218 0.696 0.657 0.082 0.867 -0.120 0.060
200104 4303 -0.342 0.251 0.040 0.029 0.089 0.532 -0.299 0.114
200201 4480 -0.306 0.290 0.156 -0.005 0.068 0.499 -0.188 0.126
200202 4346 -0.344 0.133 0.074 -0.054 -0.014 0.530 0.010 0.324
200203 4301 0.276 0.046 0.189 0.005 0.084 0.456 -0.164 0.335
200204 4143 -0.357 0.317 0.087 -0.019 0.078 0.510 -0.263 0.121
200301 4302 -0.267 0.287 0.072 -0.041 0.050 0.291 -0.127 0.114
200302 4179 -0.284 0.212 0.113 0.020 0.132 0.465 -0.039 0.209
200303 4205 -0.027 0.057 0.020 0.114 0.051 0.559 0.191 0.275
200304 4071 -0.321 0.330 0.079 -0.032 0.053 0.457 -0.304 0.014
200401 4299 -0.190 0.210 0.144 0.032 -0.034 0.571 -0.114 0.117
200402 4130 -0.287 0.157 0.146 0.042 0.147 0.488 -0.054 0.263
200403 4116 -0.199 0.125 0.138 0.004 0.185 0.535 -0.046 0.228
200404 4048 -0.181 0.253 0.131 0.007 0.032 0.474 -0.314 0.103
200501 4180 -0.161 0.058 0.180 -0.065 0.152 0.509 -0.144 0.177
200502 4101 -0.238 0.186 0.118 -0.062 0.054 0.384 -0.142 0.242
200503 4041 -0.228 0.267 0.241 0.085 0.049 0.518 -0.205 0.139
200504 3920 -0.238 0.120 0.139 -0.038 0.099 0.502 -0.240 0.162
200601 3978 -0.299 0.150 0.143 0.013 0.154 0.562 -0.015 0.268
200602 3929 -0.086 -0.196 0.131 -0.208 0.033 0.412 -0.087 0.178
200603 3869 -0.105 0.131 0.099 0.006 0.141 0.509 -0.064 0.254
200604 3811 -0.143 0.105 0.091 0.008 0.046 0.489 -0.245 0.082
200701 3827 -0.273 0.220 0.162 0.043 0.083 0.394 -0.118 0.244
200702 3787 -0.272 0.189 0.155 -0.028 0.072 0.480 -0.074 0.217
200703 3798 -0.154 0.130 0.181 0.007 0.074 0.393 -0.168 0.229
200704 3722 -0.269 0.212 0.137 -0.065 0.110 0.510 -0.230 0.097
200801 3784 -0.205 0.070 -0.328 -0.524 0.065 0.676 -0.089 0.170
200802 3698 -0.026 0.117 0.127 -0.034 -0.029 0.469 -0.090 0.283
200803 3678 -0.217 0.123 0.098 0.017 0.239 0.577 -0.071 0.272
200804 3605 -0.147 0.075 0.117 -0.032 0.006 0.593 -0.101 0.243
200901 3653 -0.030 0.045 0.051 -0.039 0.106 0.567 -0.112 0.202
200902 3556 -0.221 0.060 -0.146 -0.214 0.076 0.577 -0.117 0.225
Average 1 4,869 -0.279 0.147 0.158 0.043 0.101 0.527 -0.135 0.164
Average 2 3,985 -0.193 0.149 0.102 -0.035 0.079 0.498 -0.124 0.197
Average T 4,441 -0.237 0.148 0.131 0.005 0.090 0.513 -0.129 0.180
Av.1 - Av.2 883 -0.086 -0.003 0.057 0.078 0.022 0.029 -0.010 -0.033  
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Multiple regressions on composition ratios 
  Following the study on correlation coefficients in [IV-2] and [IV-3], I study in 
[IV-4] and [IV-5] the inter-relations among variables with multiple regressions. 
  As shown in [IV-2] and [IV-3], either among “level variables” or “difference 
variables”, with the sole prominent exception of the one between receivable and payable, 
there is no consistently stable relation among variables with high absolute value 
correlation coefficients. Upon the result of the study on correlation coefficients in [IV-2] 
and [IV-3], multiple regressions in [IV-4] and [IV-5] focus on the relationship between 
receivable and payable. Here following questions are of the primary concern. 
 
(1)  Of the two variables with a high correlation coefficient, what is the value of 
regression coefficient? How about its t-value and the Adjusted R-squares value 
of regression equation? 
(2)  What are those values when we add other variables like inventory? In that case, 
what is the size and sign of regression coefficient and t-value   of  inventory 
variable? Which values are larger in the regression of receivable (payable) on 
payable (receivable) and inventory? Does the regression result support the 
previous conclusion from correlation coefficients that the former relation is 
stronger? 
(3)  Do those values wildly vary by firm size or across time? Did they change 
radically during the “Credit Crunch” in 1997-1999, for instance?     
 
Assuming that the relationships both among “composition ratios” (lits) and among 
changes in “composition ratios” (dits) are “structural” and do not change radically not 
only during a quarter but also during the whole study period, I choose in [IV-4] and 
[IV-5] as the basic point of reference the study of manufacturing firms with 
non-zero-short-term-bank borrowing at the beginning of the quarter, to which I add 
many variations. Results on variations are to be seen with reference to the table on the 
basic case. In variations, I table the results once in 3 years (of the 1st quarter of the 
fiscal year), 6 time points during the study period.   
The 4 rows at the bottom of the table show, as before, the “averages” (for the basic 
case I show “Average 1”, “Average 2”, “Average T”, and “Av.1-Av.2”). Those “averages” 
have no specific meaning, they are just for illustration.30  
                                                  
30  In DP4, readers should note that in some cases, like regression coefficient and its 
t-value in v4=9 at 200301 in the manufacturing industry ([IV-4-4]), 3 t-values of 
regression coefficients on payable in the 2nd table for variation 1 and the t-value at  64
  The results of multiple regressions on “level variables” (lits) in [IV-4] and those 
on “difference variables” (dits) are surprisingly similar. The latter results were expected 
to vary wildly both across quarters and periods, but they were extremely stable 
throughout the study period. In this regard, my expectations were off the point, and the 
results are amazing. 
  With various specifications I compare two groups of firms, firms with non-zero- 
short-term-bank-borrowing at the beginning of the quarter (type A, v1831>0) and firms 
with zero-short-term-bank-borrowing (type B, v18=0). Although there appear slight 
differences both in regression coefficients and their t-values, but there is no prominent 
difference between those two groups. In this sense, there is no noteworthy difference in 
firm behavior, financing in particular, between them. The comparison is based on the 
expectation that there is an essential difference between two types of firms, which is 
revealed in firm’s choice, so that through comparison we will obtain useful information 
and hints for future research on the decision mechanism on short-term bank borrowing 
and the causality in making decisions concerning financial variables.   
  The above conclusion holds also during the “Credit Crunch” in 1997-1999, the 
“financial Crisis” of 2007, and the period under the ultra-easy credit policy in the 2000s.     
  For illustration, I show here the table on the basic case of [the manufacturing 
industry, all sizes, and v18>0] for [receivable (l4t ) = f (payable (l5t), inventory (l6t))]. 
                                                                                                                                                  
200301 in the 2nd table for variation 3 (both in [IV-5-1]), “outliers” in regression 
coefficients or their t-values due to unexplored reasons remarkably increase the average 
values.   
31  In this paper y1t is for the outstanding amount of short-term borrowing from financial 
institutions at time t. In the discussion papers in Japanese, following the original 
dataset, it is expressed as v18, which for reader’s convenience I maintain often in 













coefficient t-value coefficient t-value Adj R-square
199401 0.530 49.66 -0.056 -3.72 0.315
199402 0.517 45.53 -0.082 -5.52 0.282
199403 0.537 48.15 -0.058 -3.91 0.309
199404 0.539 47.34 -0.076 -5.01 0.301
199501 0.536 49.81 -0.081 -5.20 0.317
199502 0.523 48.36 -0.102 -6.74 0.305
199503 0.531 48.74 -0.060 -3.81 0.311
199504 0.518 45.99 -0.091 -5.71 0.288
199601 0.555 49.36 -0.050 -3.05 -0.050
199602 0.118 19.54 0.012 0.68 0.072
199603 0.560 48.58 -0.045 -2.93 0.324
199604 0.543 46.12 -0.063 -3.92 0.304
199701 0.576 49.46 -0.045 -2.79 0.332
199702 0.518 44.59 -0.081 -5.13 0.290
199703 0.527 45.34 -0.060 -3.86 0.299
199704 0.502 41.05 -0.079 -4.90 0.260
199801 0.562 45.63 -0.032 -1.96 0.302
199802 0.533 43.20 -0.030 -1.96 0.284
199803 0.536 42.42 -0.010 -0.62 0.277
199804 0.526 40.47 -0.026 -1.65 0.262
199901 0.526 44.07 -0.031 -1.97 0.286
199902 0.503 41.32 -0.030 -1.93 0.266
199903 0.562 46.28 -0.030 -1.94 0.314
199904 0.539 43.59 -0.065 -4.06 0.292
200001 0.624 50.68 -0.032 -1.95 0.352
200002 0.513 42.32 -0.035 -2.19 0.282
200003 0.542 43.81 -0.029 -1.72 0.300
200004 0.548 43.92 -0.080 -4.94 0.302
200101 0.620 51.43 -0.023 -1.28 0.370
200102 0.552 44.33 -0.049 -3.05 0.306
200103 0.572 43.81 -0.027 -1.66 0.304
200104 0.580 43.19 -0.068 -4.33 0.302
200201 0.678 53.41 -0.004 -0.23 0.390
200202 0.640 49.38 -0.009 -0.56 0.361
200203 0.642 50.06 -0.010 -0.68 0.370
200204 0.594 46.02 -0.045 -2.80 0.338
200301 0.376 33.61 0.032 1.74 0.211
200302 0.432 36.87 -0.005 -0.32 0.247
200303 0.362 32.88 0.016 0.91 0.207
200304 0.530 41.66 -0.033 -1.97 0.299
200401 0.599 47.92 -0.022 -1.31 0.351
200402 0.565 44.50 -0.017 -1.04 0.327
200403 0.589 47.25 -0.017 -1.06 0.356
200404 0.566 44.90 -0.056 -3.42 0.333
200501 0.610 47.08 -0.009 -0.53 0.352
200502 0.584 44.81 -0.021 -1.29 0.333
200503 0.605 47.62 -0.024 -1.51 0.363
200504 0.582 44.38 -0.018 -1.04 0.337
200601 0.415 36.87 0.017 0.99 0.258
200602 0.609 48.80 -0.056 -3.67 0.378
200603 0.596 47.51 -0.059 -3.70 0.369
200604 0.581 44.76 -0.066 -4.01 0.345
200701 0.471 39.33 0.008 0.44 0.292
200702 0.454 38.13 -0.010 -0.60 0.281
200703 0.485 39.75 -0.022 -1.29 0.296
200704 0.471 37.79 -0.048 -2.80 0.277
200801 0.614 45.43 -0.049 -3.01 0.354
200802 0.595 45.80 -0.055 -3.50 0.363
200803 0.580 45.09 -0.057 -3.65 0.357
200804 0.574 41.89 -0.054 -3.32 0.329
200901 0.618 42.60 -0.032 -2.20 0.333
200902 0.640 44.49 -0.038 -2.69 0.358
Average 1 0.530 44.94 -0.050 -3.21 0.283
Average 2 0.555 43.69 -0.025 -1.60 0.326
Average T 0.542 44.33 -0.038 -2.43 0.304
Av,1 - Av.2 -0.025 1.25 -0.025 -1.61 -0.042   66
   
Multiple regressions on changes in composition ratios 
  Following the results on composition ratios in [IV-4], [IV-5] reports the results 
of multiple regressions on changes in composition ratios. 
  The basic method and pattern of investigation is almost the same as in [IV-4]. 
Composition ratios (level variables), regarded to be “structural” depending on various 
“structural” factors, are expected to rarely vary wildly in a short period, but the changes 
in composition ratios (difference variables) in contrast have possibilities to often vary 
wildly. Moreover, if we find a prominent “change” in such a specific period as the “Credit 
Crunch” in 1997-1999, it would be useful in obtaining information about the 
relationships among difference variables, and further about firm’s financing behavior 
and financial market. Upon this expectation, in multiple regressions on change in 
composition ratios I prepare 4 basic cases in order to make it easy to compare variations 
with basic cases. (However, the results, represented by regression coefficients and their 
t-values, are surprisingly stable throughout the study period, and there is no prominent 
“change” to focus on.) 
    The 4 basic cases are all on the manufacturing industry, which are (1) all sizes 
and v18>0, (2) all sizes and v18=0, (3) v4=5 and v18>0, and (4) v4=8 and v18>0. 
  The result of the multiple regressions on change in composition ratios, at least 
seemingly, is surprisingly similar to that on composition ratios. I have not asked why, 
yet.  
    For illustration, I show here also the table on the basic case of [the 
manufacturing industry, all sizes, and v18>0] for [receivable (d4t) = f (payable (d5t), 
inventory (d6t))] ([IV-5-1]). For example, in the table on change in composition ratios the 
Average T of payable’s regression coefficient is 0.724 and t-value 45.68, and in the 













coefficient t-value coefficient t-value Adj R-square
199401 0.789 44.68 -0.396 -13.87 0.273
199402 0.881 58.54 -0.569 -26.41 0.394
199403 0.817 73.60 -0.423 -22.94 0.520
199404 1.006 67.85 -0.542 -25.66 0.473
199501 0.815 54.76 -0.514 -20.78 0.365
199502 0.728 51.72 -0.435 -17.24 0.341
199503 0.523 39.82 -0.432 -20.95 0.251
199504 0.717 47.71 -0.608 -28.58 0.432
199601 0.699 52.25 -0.601 -23.61 0.368
199602 0.817 57.97 -0.363 -14.82 0.404
199603 0.725 47.43 -0.403 -19.09 0.329
199604 0.849 54.80 -0.575 -26.33 0.420
199701 0.728 49.43 -0.480 -20.35 0.339
199702 0.599 37.40 -0.353 -16.24 0.228
199703 0.636 39.89 -0.309 -14.07 0.258
199704 0.792 49.78 -0.577 -26.74 0.395
199801 0.818 49.93 -0.543 -22.12 0.349
199802 0.623 39.03 -0.305 -12.74 0.247
199803 1.011 56.82 -0.410 -17.46 0.406
199804 0.954 93.01 -0.559 -27.31 0.675
199901 0.683 48.43 -0.316 -13.74 0.326
199902 0.657 43.71 -0.290 -15.86 0.290
199903 0.705 42.00 -0.320 -10.89 0.274
199904 0.566 41.35 -0.561 -24.83 0.330
200001 0.899 42.23 -0.381 -16.03 0.280
200002 0.747 44.52 -0.326 -13.00 0.303
200003 0.436 33.78 -0.324 -16.76 0.205
200004 0.453 31.47 -0.584 -26.98 0.277
200101 -0.062 -1.50 -0.299 -4.76 0.006
200102 0.808 46.34 -0.438 -15.80 0.326
200103 1.270 124.55 -0.555 -24.58 0.781
200104 0.835 48.83 -0.652 -30.97 0.414
200201 0.750 42.50 -0.469 -20.37 0.312
200202 0.722 44.18 -0.330 -13.62 0.310
200203 0.690 43.09 -0.294 -26.72 0.320
200204 0.717 44.14 -0.582 -26.47 0.367
200301 0.690 21.33 -0.524 -11.16 0.110
200302 0.635 35.70 -0.279 -10.25 0.235
200303 0.732 41.20 0.059 3.02 0.313
200304 0.805 35.28 -0.675 -23.77 0.305
200401 0.799 48.16 -0.330 -14.90 0.359
200402 0.667 39.24 -0.353 -14.21 0.273
200403 0.677 43.47 -0.275 -13.39 0.316
200404 0.763 40.39 -0.751 -28.96 0.357
200501 0.735 42.45 -0.448 -18.59 0.316
200502 0.581 30.99 -0.464 -17.43 0.206
200503 0.725 43.31 -0.577 -21.94 0.346
200504 0.771 42.88 -0.595 -25.48 0.358
200601 0.678 45.72 -0.355 -13.38 0.345
200602 0.494 30.33 -0.251 -11.33 0.196
200603 0.692 40.35 -0.354 -14.82 0.299
200604 0.708 38.18 -0.488 -21.35 0.320
200701 0.615 30.21 -0.401 -15.31 0.204
200702 0.697 36.47 -0.375 -13.12 0.264
200703 0.574 30.97 -0.441 -18.51 0.224
200704 0.746 40.08 -0.544 -21.03 0.338
200801 0.893 60.95 -0.486 -18.00 0.499
200802 0.633 36.75 -0.387 -16.55 0.273
200803 0.816 48.03 -0.416 -18.34 0.388
200804 0.782 50.06 -0.577 -19.89 0.416
200901 0.805 46.05 -0.472 -17.68 0.375
200902 0.795 47.53 -0.522 -19.42 0.397
Average 1 0.735 50.38 -0.451 -19.73 0.352
Average 2 0.713 40.67 -0.432 -17.43 0.311
Average T 0.724 45.68 -0.442 -18.62 0.333
Av,1 - Av.2 0.022 9.71 -0.019 -2.30 0.041   68
[I&S-8]. Interesting Observations 
 
At the opening of [I&S-2], I wrote as follows. 
 
The conventional wisdom that financial institutions, big banks in particular, have 
dominated the Japanese financial market and played there the key roles has long 
been an obvious basic assumption in research and policy debate over the Japanese 
financial phenomena. First, this research begins with pointing out that this 
conventional wisdom is and has been a misunderstanding and misconception, a 
myth fatally deviating from the reality. Consequently, from the start to the end, the 
content of this research has a wide variety of and grave implications both to 
research and policy discussion on financial market issues. 
Among the sectors obtaining funds from the market, corporate sector, therefore 
firms, small businesses in particular, has gathered the greatest interest both of the 
researchers and policy makers. Second, at least partly because of the stable 
dominance of the conventional wisdom as a foundation in research and policy debate 
in Japan, CEStat, CEQStat in particular, that provides relevant statistical 
information by far of the best quality, has rarely been used effectively in research on 
financial phenomena or policy debate. It is extremely productive to show in detail 
that active use of CEStat, its firm-level data in particular, is effective in escaping 
from confusion, chaos, and calamity based on the misconceptions. In light of the 
predominance of the conventional wisdom in Japan, this second point might be the 
most basic message of this research. 
 
Upon those two basic points, this research conducts a full-fledged organization of basic 
information about financing behavior of Japanese firms, small businesses in particular, 
critically reviewing the dominant view or the conventional wisdom about related issues.   
  As a consequence of the basic character, this research directly draws few clear 
“conclusions”, and it does not fit in so easily with “summary”. Instead, I list below points 
and observations that I found on the process of the study and still remain impressive 
and interesting to me at its close, which I believe useful for readers in understanding 
behavior of Japanese firms, small businesses in particular, organized in the report.     
 
(1)  Even when we focus only on financing (and asset allocation), the behavior of firms 
in Japan ranges widely. Together with “representative figures” obtainable also 
from summary statistics published as the result of CEStat (CEAStat and CEQStat)  69
surveys, particularly for understanding the reality of great diversity in Japanese 
firms we should promote mote active utilization of firm-level data from those 
statistics. 
(2)  In light of the low bank dependence ratio (much lower than the conventional 
wisdom has argued), the relationship between bank’s lending- and firm’s borrowing 
behavior is by far remoter than has been widely assumed. The analytical method, 
that has been a foundation of the conventional wisdom, adopts the information 
about bank’s lending behavior as a good substitute of firm’s borrowing behavior, 
implicitly assuming either one-to-one correspondence or virtual integration. It has 
been a source of misunderstanding and a cause of big trouble. Examination of 
firm’s financing and asset allocation behavior, too, must be conducted upon exact 
reality of examination objects.   
(3)  With the exception of listed firms for which security filings are available, CEStat is 
about the only source that provides good statistical information about firms 
including small businesses in Japan. Nevertheless, CEStat including the published 
summary statistics has rarely been utilized in research and policy debate on 
financial phenomena and finance related policies including small business policies.   
As a result, the conventional wisdom that has been a foundation of those research 
and policies is a misconception, misunderstanding, or a myth substantially 
deviating from the reality. Not only such a situation has been left as it is but also it 
has faced with few serious challenge or sense of crisis. 
(4)  The evil of above point (3) is particularly serious concerning small business. In 
Japan, small businesses have received special treatment in a world of this “myth”. 
Recent heated policy discussion (or fiasco) over the “bank’s reluctance to small 
business lending” and rapid expansion of related policies are symbolic. 
Unsurprisingly, neither coherent logical explanation nor persuasive evidence is 
presented. 
(5)  What is the most surprising and impressive in this research is the Japanese firm’s 
low bank (to be precise, financial institutions) dependence ratio, the ratio of bank 
borrowing, short-term borrowing in particular, to total asset: Even in the 1960s the 
bank dependence ratio was by far lower than has been argued by the conventional 
wisdom, and since then it has consistently decreased to the present. I think it 
appropriate to call it “‘low bank dependence’ and ‘further increase in independence 
of firms from banks’”. I was deeply surprised to find that this “increase in 
independence” has accelerated under the ultra-easy credit policy under 
“zero-lending-rate” in the 2000s and that these “low bank dependence ratio” and  70
“further increase in independence from banks” have been more prominent among 
small businesses than among ultra-big excellent companies that are alleged to be 
advantageous in making access to international capital market. 
(6)  With the sole exception of receivable-payable relations (stable high positive 
correlation coefficient is symbolic), the study of inter-relations among composition 
variables such as short-term borrowing, long-term borrowing, deposit, receivable, 
payable, and inventory shows no noteworthy strong relation. Moreover, it is 
impressive that such inter-relationship is observed stably throughout the study 
period. No long-term changing trend is observed. No prominent change is observed 
during the “Credit Crunch” in 1997-1999 and the “financial crisis” of 2007, either. 
(7)  The above point (6) with little modification applies also to the study of 
inter-relations among changes in composition ratios. I expected to find prominent 
phenomena that had emerged in response to “outside shocks” during the “Credit 
Crunch” in 1997-1999 or in the “financial crisis” of 2007, which would be useful in 
understanding the inter-relations among changes in composition ratios. 
Unfortunately, however, no such prominent phenomena recognized to be a sign of 
those shocks. Of the points (6) and (7), I was more deeply surprised at the stability 
of inter-relations among changes in composition ratios.   
(8)  Concerning any of short-term borrowing, long-term borrowing, and total borrowing 
(sum of short-term- and long-term borrowing), there is no close relationship with 
other financial variables studied in this research. For example, there is no 
observation that suggests an often claimed relation that firms finding difficulty in 
obtaining bank borrowing actively use payables as its alternative funding source. 
(9)  We have only extremely poor information about trade credit, both detailed basic 
information and explanations on its transaction. Under such a situation, the view 
that “trade credit is used primarily for inventory finance” has been accepted as the 
conventional wisdom. This view, however, is obscure and vague, whose substance is 
almost completely unclear. Investigation on the basis of CEStat shows that, 
whatever the interpretation, this conventional wisdom is not supported by the 
data. 
(10)  Of inter-relationships among receivable, payable, and inventory, the relation 
between receivable and payable is strong and stable, but the one between 
inventory and receivable or payable is neither strong nor stable. The conventional 
wisdom has long argued, “trade credit is the means for large companies that enjoy 
advantages in bank borrowing to supply credit to small businesses”. Data from the 
CEStat do not support this view, either in the study period of FY1994-FY2009 or in  71
several decades since the 1960s.   
(11)    The research covers the period when the financial market since the burst of 
“Bubble” has been roller-coaster and a series of close encounters with new 
unknown phenomena. Observers consistently criticized that the various troubles 
and slow response in related policies have been an important cause of the “Lost 
Two Decades”. On various fronts I was often surprised at a weak (or no) 
correspondence between observations drawn from data and the widely accepted 
“facts”. Most symbolically, I find not serious impact of the “Credit Crunch” in 
1997-1999 on firm’s financing behavior, including that of the impact of actual 
collapse of several financial institutions which had been alleged to be so grave.   
(12)  Heated discussion and prominent expansion of small business policies 
symbolizes the Japanese economy during the past two decades since the bust of 
“Bubble”, the so-called “Lost Two Decades”. Emphasizing the seriousness of “banks’ 
reluctance to small business lend” and its decisive importance to the Japanese 
economy, the Japanese government expanded small business policies on a 
historically unprecedented scale and scope, at the center of which is the “credit 
guarantee policy”. In none of its necessity, importance as policy issue, and 
effectiveness and efficiency of the policy that ensures its continuous 
implementation, either coherent logical explanation or persuasive evidence is 
available. It is not easy to draw grounds to support any of them from the study of 
firm’s financing (asset allocation) behavior using firm-level data from the CEQStat. 
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[I&S-9]. Appendix: Abstracts of DI1~DP4 
 
[I&S-9-1] Abstract of DP1 
 
“The Low ‘Bank-Dependence Ratio’ and Recent Further Increase in the ‘Independence of 
Firms from Banks’” (DP1, Miwa [2010d]) 
 
This is the first of the 4 discussion papers that, together with the Introduction and 
Summary paper (Miwa, 2010c), comprise the report of my recent investigation: “A Study 
of Financing Behavior of Japanese Firms with Firm-Level Data from the Corporate 
Enterprise Quarterly Statistics – 1994~2009”.   
  A basic premise to most studies of Japanese financial phenomena has been the 
dominant role played by banks. Hoshi and Kashyap [2001, p.310] wrote that banks 
“were the only game in town”. Observers argue that this bank dominance continued 
even after the “financial liberalization” of the 1980s, through which the largest firms 
obtained access to international capital market.   
Using firm-level financial data from the Hojin Kigyo Tokei Kiho (Corporate 
Enterprise Quarterly Statistics) of the Ministry of Finance, I find that the ratio of 
zero-short-term-borrowing firms is highest, 50% in 1998 and two-thirds in 2008, among 
the smallest firms. I also find the average (short-term bank borrowing)/(total asset) 
ratio was lowest among these firms. Much the same phenomena characterize the 
patterns of long-term-borrowing ratio. Under the “zero-interest-rate, quantity easing” 
monetary policy, the low “bank dependence ratio” among firms fell further. 
Using annual financial data from Corporate Enterprise Annual Statistics since 
the 1960s, I also show that even in the 1960s the bank-dependence ratio was lower than 
commonly perceived. Since then, it has declined consistently.   
Those findings constitute a fundamental challenge to the conventional wisdom 
about the financial market and financial regulation in Japan.        73
[I&S-9-2] Abstract of DP2 
 
“The Reality of Short-term Shocks like the ‘Credit Crunch’ of 1997-1999 and the 
‘Financial Crisis’ of 2007, and the Effectiveness of ‘Emergency’ Economic 
Measures – A Follow-up to Miwa [2008]” (DP1, Miwa [2010e]) 
 
This is the second of the 4 discussion papers that, together with the Introduction and 
Summary paper (Miwa, 2010c), comprise the report of my recent investigation: “A Study 
of Financing Behavior of Japanese Firms with Firm-Level Data from the Corporate 
Enterprise Quarterly Statistics – 1994~2009”.   
  In Miwa [2008], I used quarterly financial data on about 6,000 firms with over 
¥600 million in paid-in capital to question the purported success of Japanese policy 
toward the financial crisis and the accumulated bad loans at banks, the debate over the 
causes of the Lost Decade, and postwar financial regulation more generally. This paper 
is a follow-up to Miwa [2008]. It expands the period studied from 1994-2000 to 
1994-2009, expands the focus to include much smaller firms, and redesigns the study to 
encompass wider issues.   
  Taking the basic finding reported in Miwa [2010d] into consideration, I 
classified firms into two groups: firms with non-zero short-term-bank-borrowing at the 
beginning of the term (type A), and all others (type B). Focusing on the type A firms, I 
control the predominant influence of zero-short-term-bank-borrowing firms, and 
confirm the conclusion of Miwa [2008]. 
  In the second half of the paper, I investigate the distribution of the ratio of the 
amount of financial items like payables, receivables, and inventory to total assets (level 
variables), and the change in the amount of financial items to total assets (difference 
variables). Surprisingly, the distributions both in level variables and difference 
variables remained stable during the “Credit Crunch”, the “Financial Crisis”, and the 
“zero-interest-rate, quantity easing” monetary policy period. 
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[I&S-9-3] Abstract of DP3 
 
“The Reality of Trade Credit and its Link to Bank Borrowing and Inventory: (1) Overall 
Discussion and Preliminary Investigation” (DP3, Miwa [2010f]) 
 
This is the third of the 4 discussion papers that, together with the Introduction and 
Summary paper (Miwa, 2010c), comprise the report of my recent investigation: “A Study 
of Financing Behavior of Japanese Firms with Firm-Level Data from Corporate 
Enterprise Quarterly Statistics – 1994~2009”. 
  The findings in the first two discussion papers invite readers to consider “trade 
credit”, and ask “what were the alternative sources of financing for the firms? Did they 
involve trade credit?” Some readers will recall that -- when criticized by the public and 
the government for not lending more extensively -- the banks had replied that good 
borrowers were not asking for money. 
  Because of the strength of the conventional wisdom, most researchers and 
policy makers have focused on bank finance. They have neglected the place within the 
financial market for other sources of funds like trade credit. This paper first reviews the 
current state of discussions about trade credit (III-2). It then provides an overview of 
the relationship among trade partners and banks (III-3). It uses firm-level data on trade 
credit (payables and receivables) and other financial items like bank borrowings, 
deposit, and inventory. Finally, it compares positive-bank-borrowing firms and 
zero-bank-borrowing firms, and concludes that there is no clear and important 
difference between them. In turn, this suggests that whether a firm borrowed from 
banks had no bearing on whether it suffered from financial constraints. 
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[I&S-9-4] Abstract of DP4 
 
“The Reality of Trade Credit and its Link to Bank Borrowing and Inventory: (2) 
Correlation Coefficients and Multiple Regressions” (DP4, Miwa [2010g]) 
 
This is the last of the 4 discussion papers that, together with the Introduction and 
Summary paper (Miwa, 2010c), comprise the report of my recent investigation: “A Study 
of Financing Behavior of Japanese Firms with Firm-Level Data from Corporate 
Enterprise Quarterly Statistics – 1994~2009”. 
  In the third paper, I examined the place of trade credit in Japan. Here, I 
continue that exploration, and turn to trade credit patterns during the “Credit Crunch.”   
I examine the correlation among various financial variables, including the ratio of 
specific variables to total assets (level variables), and the ratio of the change in specific 
variables to total assets (difference variables). The results are surprisingly stable over 
time, and similar between level variables and difference variables.   
The only stable relation is between payables and receivables. This appears in 
multiple regression studies both on level variables and on difference variables -- and 
appears for the size and t-value of regression coefficients and adj. R squares. Moreover, 
the results are stable over time, and similar between level variables and difference 
variables. 
Observers argue that Japan experienced a serious “Credit Crunch” during 
1997-1999, but has avoided much of the confusion caused by the recent world-wide 
“financial crisis.” The data I studied suggest the opposite. I find no indication of any 
serious “credit crunch” ten years ago, but find a drastic decrease both in payables and in 
receivables in firms of all sizes.      76
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